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Gregg P. Macey



ABSTRACT
Public organizations, including those involved in contingency
planning, have tremendous influence over the ultimate scale and scope
of an environmental crisis. Yet our understanding of how
organizational behavior can either rein in or exacerbate crises
continues to lag behind advances in technology. This Article considers
the role of public organizations in the blowout of the Macondo well in
the Gulf of Mexico. Its theoretical lens is the “paradox of organizing,” a
frame that I suggest should be applied to interorganizational responses
to low-probability, high-consequence events. The struggle to differentiate
tasks and subunits and then piece them together during moments of
great uncertainty can challenge and strain contingency planning, such
as what is envisioned by the National Contingency Plan. Through the
paradox of organizing, the organizational roots of a crisis, such as the
accidental release of oil or hazardous substances, are recreated and
amplified during an interorganizational response to that crisis. I
discuss several dynamics that were reproduced by the response system
awakened by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. They included risk
amplification and system degradation due to the structure of the
response, through processes including “anarchy,” “drift,” and “fire
fighting.” They also involved the tasks of making sense of information
within the response effort, which erases detail, limits whether data can
be used to detect anomalies, and encourages responders to develop their
own plausible rationales for equivocal data so that they can resume
interrupted tasks. These dynamics go beyond the narratives that
dominate standard regulatory accounts of accidents. They point to how
multiagency response can intensify the paradox of organizing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental law was borne out of crisis.1 Our most storied
regulatory achievements happened because shocking and often
sudden events—among them the burning Cuyahoga River,2 noxious
1. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 58–60 (2004). I
focus here on industrial crises, in keeping with Shrivastava’s study of situations where
“organized industrial activities are the source of major damage to human life, and natural and
social environments” that “extend beyond the organization of origin to encompass a broad
range of economic, social and political agents and forces.” Paul Shrivastava, Ian I. Mitroff,
Danny Miller & Anil Miglani, Understanding Industrial Crises, 25 J. MGMT. STUD. 285, 287
(1988). More broadly, crises can be viewed as “low probability/high consequence events.”
Karl E. Weick, Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations, 25 J. MGMT. STUD. 305, 305 (1988).
2. The Cuyahoga River saga and other events led to the enactment of the Clean Water
Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga:
Reconstructing a History of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 94–95
(2002); Sandra Zellmer, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina
World, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599, 625 (2007).
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chemicals in the basements of Love Canal,3 deadly plumes of methyl
isocyanate in Bhopal,4 and crude oil strewn across Prince William
Sound5—catalyzed a nascent movement6 and helped overcome the
collective action problems that stood in the way of social change.7 In
so doing, these focal points8 and the laws they inspired gave federal
and state agencies responsibilities that heretofore had been left to
private ordering or local governments.9 Forty years into this
regulatory experiment, the onset of man-made disasters10—linked to
everything from thermal energy spikes in the lower atmosphere11 to
the spread of unruly technologies12—proceeds apace.
Environmental law will continue to revisit these kinds of
upheavals, but with unprecedented frequency. James Speth argues
3. Love Canal sparked a heightened interest in hazardous waste sites that led to the
enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). See Robert V. Percival, Regulatory
Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 173.
4. Bhopal contributed to a legislative atmosphere in which the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 300–330,
100 Stat. 1728 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2006)), was passed. See
Susan G. Hadden, Citizen Participation in Environmental Policy Making, in LEARNING FROM
DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 92–93 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking,
Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 259 n.2 (2001).
5. Following the Exxon Valdez disaster Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006). Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters:
Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon
Blowout Finally Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11041,
11043 (2010).
6. See Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS
L.J. 395, 414 (1995); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 212 (2001).
7. Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 59, 66–67 (1992). See generally Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity,
Pressure, and Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability Campaigns, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 2147 (2009).
8. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1649, 1659 (2000).
9. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DAVID L. MARKELL, WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, DANIEL R.
MANDELKER & A. DAN TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 65–67
(5th ed. 2007).
10. Barry A. Turner, The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of
Disasters, 21 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 378, 381–82 (1976).
11. For how a modest increase in global temperature might influence geopolitics in
various parts of the world, see GWYNNE DYER, CLIMATE WARS: THE FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL AS
THE WORLD OVERHEATS 1–2, 29–40, 75–84, 111–21, 215–26 (2010).
12. See LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN
AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 127–30 (1989).
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that environmental regulation may soon become “a law of coping
with crisis and urgent remediation.”13 J.B. Ruhl speculates that it
might be forced to split into distinct branches: one to address
pollution control and conservation and others devoted entirely to
mitigation and adaptation.14 Environmental law is thus revisiting its
roots in crisis. This Article explores lessons that regulators have not
learned as they have uneasily tended to the crises that ushered in the
regulations that guide their behavior. Its focus is on environmental
crisis management, particularly the contingency planning system that
sets out how the government will contain, disperse, and otherwise
mitigate releases of oil and hazardous substances. Additionally, this
Article addresses the “failure of response systems to improve
alongside advances in exploration technology,”15 such as the systems
that plagued deepwater drilling before the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill and haunted the response effort that followed. Those systems
amplify the “paradox of organizing,” which can lead to predictable
pathologies in the wake of a crisis.
Legal scholars have begun to point to how environmental
regulations are of limited use in preparing for crisis. For example,
regulations are fragmented and unadaptive,16 focus on slow-moving
rather than sudden events,17 rely on ill-placed standards and
13. James Gustave Speth, On One Hand, Danger, on the Other, Security, ENVTL. F.,
Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 51.
14. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 434–35 (2010).
15. Memorandum from the Bipartisan Policy Ctr. to the Nat’l Comm’n on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling 13 (Aug. 25, 2010) [hereinafter
Memorandum], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/36467810/Response-of-theBipartisan-Policy-Center-to-the-Oil-Spill-Commission.
16. Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 25–26 (2009). Recently,
climate-change law, or lack thereof, has been under fire for its failure to prepare for crisis.
Without significant legislation to prevent or address global climate change, scholars point to
the failure of existing laws to mitigate its effects in the interim. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig,
“Stationary is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change
Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 35 (2010) (discussing the difficulties of applying
the preservation and restoration schemes in current laws to the less predictable outcomes of
climate change); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon
Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY
L.J. 103, 128–32 (2008) (noting the promising nature of carbon capture and sequestration
and pointing out deficiencies in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and
CERCLA with regard to governing the regulatory issues that it would present).
17. Michael B. Gerrard, Disasters First: Rethinking Environmental Law After September
11, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 223, 223–24 (2003). Chemical accidents or terrorist attacks on
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triggers,18 and avoid the land-use planning decisions that would
buffer vulnerable citizens against the devastation that follows a
disaster.19 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita unveiled the stunning range
of contributors to environmental crisis, from pre-hurricane
vulnerabilities to forces that led to unforeseen problems once the

facilities that use or store hazardous chemicals are another area where existing laws fall short in
preparing for a crisis. Gerrard argues that we should focus less on incremental environmental
hazards, such as those addressed by CERCLA, and more on the sudden events that have more
of an impact on human health. Id. In the chemical regulatory context, scholars have pointed to
weaknesses in the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the
EPA’s Risk Management Plans (RMPs), and RCRA in their ability to properly secure facilities.
See, e.g., Leticia M. Diaz, Chemical Homeland Security, Fact or Fiction: Is the U.S. Ready for an
Attack on Our Chemical Facilities? An Examination of State and Federal Laws Aimed at
Immediate Remediation, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1171, 1183–84 (2007). Diaz notes that OSHA,
CAA, and EPCRA fail to provide vulnerability assessments for chemical facilities, while RCRA’s
requirements that facilities have warning signs, controlled entry gates, and surveillance apply to
only twenty-one percent of the total number of chemical facilities. See id.; see also Timothy F.
Malloy, Of Natmats, Terrorists, and Toxics: Regulatory Adaptation in a Changing World, 26
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93, 110–13 (2008) (noting that EPA’s RMP for chemical and
petroleum refineries does not include provisions to create inherently safer designs, but instead
focuses on risk management).
18. Triggers for regulatory action are often keyed to quantity- or risk-based thresholds
that invite unchecked pollution or accumulation of risk up to those thresholds. Triggers also
present regulatory gaps that can be exploited by industry, leading to facility expansions and
grandfathering older, riskier facilities. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz,
Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1681–82 (2007); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The
Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 42
(2011).
19. See, e.g., Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government
Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178–79 (2006) (describing the unintended consequences of
pre-Katrina urban expansion in New Orleans); William R. Freudenburg, Robert Gramling,
Shirley Laska, & Kai T. Erikson, Organizing Hazards, Engineering Disasters? Improving the
Recognition of Political-Economic Factors in the Creation of Disasters, 87 SOC. FORCES 1015,
1022–28 (2008) (describing floodplain development in the Mississippi Delta region before
Hurricane Katrina and the effects of 100-year flood protection and the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet on development patterns, vulnerability, and the intensity of hurricane damage).
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floodwaters began to recede.20 As a result, legal scholars concerned
with crisis are greatly interested in the work of social scientists.21
This Article makes a more foundational argument. It is an
argument hinted at by investigations of well-known disasters and
underscored by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and frantic efforts to
kill the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico. The notion is
deceptively simple: what stands between us and the scale and scope
of future environmental crises are organizations.22 For residents of
petrochemical corridors, dense urban areas, and flood-hazard
regions, this notion is unsettling for two reasons. First, by virtue of
their ubiquity, organizations, both public and private, have “a nearmonopoly of control over access to most of the sources of energy
which could be discharged to produce disasters.”23 Second,
regulators have barely begun to appreciate all that can go wrong in a
world governed by such social structures.
By undertheorizing how organizations not only cause but also
shape crises, regulators tell similar stories about accidents,24
disasters,25 and other events. They respond by passing the same
20. Contributors included man-made channels—dug to ease the flow of commerce and
direct storm surges inland toward major populations—and reclamation projects that cleared
away protective wetlands. WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG, ROBERT GRAMLING, SHIRLEY LASKA
& KAI T. ERIKSON, CATASTROPHE IN THE MAKING: THE ENGINEERING OF KATRINA AND
THE DISASTERS OF TOMORROW 111–34 (2009). Stormwater surges left behind a toxic sludge
that accumulated from years of industry and agriculture in the region, along with spills from oil
platforms and vessels, leading to widespread allergy-like sinus and respiratory problems. Laura
J. Steinberg, Hatice Sengul & Ana Maria Cruz, Natech Risk and Management: An Assessment
of the State of the Art, 46 NAT. HAZARDS 143, 146 (2008).
21. For an overview of social-science research with a focus on disasters’ social
production, see Kathleen J. Tierney, From the Margins to the Mainstream? Disaster Research at
the Crossroads, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 503, 503 (2007).
22. For a similar remark about the capacity of public organizations to prevent further
acts of terrorism in the United States, see Steven Kelman, 9/11 and the Challenges of Public
Management, 51 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 129 (2006) (book review). For the purposes of this Article, I
define organizations broadly to include “a series of interlocking routines, habituated action
patterns that bring the same people together around the same activities in the same time and
places.” This definition includes public and private organizations. Karl E. Weick, The Collapse
of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 628, 632
(1993) (quoting Frances R. Westley, Middle Managers and Strategy: Microdynamics of
Inclusion, 11 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 337, 339 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. BARRY A. TURNER & NICK F. PIDGEON, MAN-MADE DISASTERS 133 (1997).
24. An accident is “an unexpected and unintentional event that is the product of
chance.” Thomas D. Beamish, Accumulating Trouble: Complex Organization, a Culture of
Silence, and a Secret Spill, 47 SOC. PROB. 473, 473 (2000).
25. Disaster research began with studies of collective behavior under high stress,
including conditions as they might exist in a homogeneous public following nuclear war. The
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species of laws which address symptoms instead of underlying
dynamics. The basic narrative of an environmental crisis presents
several themes: production pressures or financial incentives loomed
large (the “amoral calculator” argument);26 these pressures and
incentives were not counterbalanced by sufficient enforcement of
standards;27 agencies were captured;28 untrained individuals made
mistakes;29 government lacked the resources, personnel, and
research was functionalist, concerned with how a community returns to normalcy after a
disruption. As such, disasters were viewed as events “concentrated in time and space” and
leading to loss of life or property and a disruption in social structure or the provision of social
services. Charles E. Fritz, Disaster, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 651, 655 (Robert
K. Merton & Robert A. Nisbet eds., 1961). Disasters are now treated as ongoing, episodic,
socially constructed, and often foreseeable processes. See generally BEN WISNER, PIERS
BLAIKIE, TERRY CANNON & IAN DAVIS, AT RISK: NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE’S
VULNERABILITY AND DISASTERS (2004). A more accurate definition of disaster begins with a
“cascade of failures triggered by an extreme event that is exacerbated by inadequate planning
and ill-informed individual and organizational actions.” Id.
26. For a discussion of the “amoral calculator” model as an explanation for managerial
misconduct, see Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of
Organizations, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 23 (1998). For a classic debunking of the argument, see
DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE,
AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 35–39 (1996). See also NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND
THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 125–26 (2011) [hereinafter DEEPWATER HORIZON
OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT] (listing time-saving decisions at the Macondo well by BP,
Transocean, and Halliburton).
27. ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N, FINAL REPORT: SPILL: THE WRECK OF THE EXXON
VALDEZ: IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFE TRANSPORTATION 16, 20–23, 33 (1990) [hereinafter
ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT], available at http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol1/A/
21337991.pdf; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 2, 4,
68, 72–74; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED
FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI 20–21, 46–48, 55, 63, 66–67 (1979) [hereinafter THREE
MILE ISLAND COMM’N REPORT], available at http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//
188.pdf; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 102–04 (1990). But see Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, ManagementBased Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 691, 692, 700–06 (2003).
28. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 31, 34, 45; DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 62, 76–78; MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 27–28 (rev.
ed. 1971); THREE MILE ISLAND COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 51–52; Peter L. Kahn,
The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
280, 284–85 (1990); Plater, supra note 5, at 11,042 (“The official state and local regulatory
agencies often uncritically accepted industry data and assurances on the design and safety of
system elements, issued permits without required documentation, did not insist on strict
compliance with corporate and federal rules, and on occasions when they attempted to assert
regulatory vigilance were resisted, delayed, or overturned by the industry’s greater resources
and political momentum.”).
29. For a discussion of the role of operator error in accounts of disasters, see generally
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expertise to monitor, inspect, or audit the setting adequately;30 and a
lack of sufficient redundancy31 or state-of-the-art technology32
ushered in ill-fated events.
Lawmakers respond in kind to these narratives with efforts to
centralize enforcement as well as emergency response and with calls
for closer coordination among agencies.33 They posit that to
counteract agency capture, the new or consolidated agency should
be independent and given greater oversight powers.34 Redundant
systems should be brought online, as should next-generation
technologies.35 Data disclosures, real-time monitoring and data
logging, unannounced inspections, mandatory personnel levels, and
self-regulatory or third-party certifiers should be introduced or
ratcheted up to address enforcement gaps.36 Complacency and
CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984).
For Heinrich’s early definition of an industrial accident as the “conjunction of a human error
and a chance event,” see Rachel Barkan, Dov Zohar & Ido Erev, Accidents and Decision
Making Under Uncertainty: A Comparison of Four Models, 74 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 118, 118 (1998). See also ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra
note 27, at 24–26; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 28,
57, 65, 76–77, 119, 122, 126; THREE MILE ISLAND COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 10–
11, 20, 22–23, 27, 43–44, 47, 49–50; Everett C. Hughes, Mistakes at Work, 17 CAN. J.
ECON. & POL. SCI. 320 (1951) (examining mistakes in human work generally).
30. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 13–14, 20–21, 23–24,
32–35, 41–42; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 68, 72–
75, 126–27; THREE MILE ISLAND COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 21–22, 44–48, 55;
Dara O’Rourke & Gregg P. Macey, Community Environmental Policing: Assessing New
Strategies of Public Participation in Environmental Regulation, 22 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 383, 383–85 (2003).
31. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 32; DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 97–98; THREE MILE ISLAND
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 53, 89.
32. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 17, 32; DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 56, 135, 251, 269–70, 272–73;
THREE MILE ISLAND COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 72–73, 81.
33. See Benjamin H. Grumbles & Joan M. Manley, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990:
Legislation in the Wake of a Crisis, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 35, 35 (1995); Anne Joseph
O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the
Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1655–57 (2006).
34. See Holly Doremus, Through Another’s Eyes: Getting the Benefit of Outside
Perspectives in Environmental Review, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 247, 250–53 (2011);
Plater, supra note 5, at 11,046.
35. See generally Grumbles & Manley, supra note 33, at 36; Mark A. Latham, Five
Thousand Feet and Below: The Failure to Adequately Regulate Deepwater Oil Production
Technology, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 343 (2011).
36. See Karkkainen, supra note 4 (evaluating in a comprehensive manner EPA’s Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI) program); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate:
Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 447–50 (2011).
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neglect should be met with proposals to consider worst-case
scenarios and engender ill-defined “cultures” of safety.37
These concerns are relevant subjects of inquiry, and an effort has
been made to point out the bureaucratic causes of, for example,
capture and inadequate enforcement.38 But the importance of
organizations as units of analysis has not received adequate attention
in the regulatory response to environmental crisis. Some accounts,
including the President’s commission to investigate the causes of the
British Petroleum (BP) oil spill, point out that crises occur within
complex social systems.39 Other accounts hint at the managerial
problems that arise from such complexity or call for improvements to
the “culture” of an offshore drilling operator or other entity.40 But
concern for the deviant, “routine by-product[s]” of social systems41
and their influence over the emergency response architecture that
grew out of the Exxon Valdez spill, lags well behind advances in
social science.
Early attempts to understand how organizations function,
survive, and influence society have yielded a thriving constellation of
scholars in sociology, management, public administration, and other
disciplines42 who are committed to Talcott Parsons’ mandate that we
37. See Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to
Be a Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11033, 11036 (2010) (describing OPA’s required facility
response plans for worst-case scenarios); Rena Steinzor, Lessons from the North Sea: Should
“Safety Cases” Come to America?, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 417, 417 (2011).
38. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of
Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (explaining how land
management agencies with multiple goals will systematically overperform on those that are
complementary or easier to measure); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory
Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167
(1990) (discussing the role of slack in agency capture); David B. Spence, Managing Delegation
Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 415–17 (1999)
(describing how organizational structure can influence susceptibility to agency capture).
39. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 15–30; DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at viii–x, 223–24; THREE MILE
ISLAND COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 63–64.
40. See, e.g., DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at ix,
217–25; NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE UNITED STATES 353–57; 416–18 (2004).
41. Diane Vaughan, The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster,
25 ANN. REV. SOC. 271, 274 (1999) (“Organizational deviance, in its generic form, can be
understood as routine nonconformity: a predictable and recurring product of all socially
organized systems.”).
42. For an overview, see W. Richard Scott, Reflections on a Half-Century of
Organizational Sociology, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 1 (2004).
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examine “the role of organizations in the larger sociocultural
system.”43 These networks include a smaller, innovative group of
scholars focused on the organizational roots of crisis, breathing
added life and complexity into Philip Selznick’s work on how
organizations become “institutionalized” and take on lives of their
own in ways that divert them from their formal missions.44 The
events of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, the BP oil spill, and other manmade disasters pose a challenge to this theoretical outpost, as well as
to environmental law: how do we take what we know about the
uniquely organizational contributors to crises45 and devise
regulations that more effectively guide how we respond to those
crises?
This Article considers the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in order to
set out the contours of this necessary conversation. I demonstrate
that the institutional and administrative arrangements that encourage
crises are reproduced during the response period.46 This happens
because the cross-organization plans in use during an emergency
response provide a more expansive canvas on which the structural
and cognitive problems of organizing are magnified. Finally, I
discuss several puzzles in the organization theory literature that
should be addressed if we are to avoid intensifying the paradox of
organizing during the next crisis.
II. DEEPWATER BLOWOUTS AND THE PARADOX OF ORGANIZING
The paradox of organizing embraces the notion that
organizations are open systems. Our concept of the organization has
evolved over decades of inquiry as processing power and theory
developed, from a research setting where engineers draft
43. W. Richard Scott, The Mandate Is Still Being Honored: In Defense of Weber’s
Disciples, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 163, 163 (1996).
44. See Philip Selznick, Institutionalism “Old” and “New,” 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 270, 271
(1996).
45. For key earlier works on the organizational roots of crisis, see THIERRY C.
PAUCHANT & IAN I. MITROFF, TRANSFORMING THE CRISIS-PRONE ORGANIZATION (1992);
PERROW, supra note 29; BARRY A. TURNER, MAN-MADE DISASTERS (1978); Robert P.
Gephart, Making Sense of Organizationally Based Environmental Disasters, 10 J. MGMT. 205
(1984); Paul Shrivastava, Industrial Crisis Management: Learning from Organizational
Failures, 25 J. MGMT. STUD. 283 (1988); Karl E. Weick, The Collapse of Sensemaking
Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 628 (1993).
46. For a discussion of the stages of disaster including the response phase, see David A.
McEntire, Christopher Fuller, Chad W. Johnston & Richard Weber, A Comparison of Disaster
Paradigms: The Search for a Holistic Policy Guide, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 267 (2002).
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management principles and experimentally arrange workers and
tasks,47 to a more ethnographic space,48 to the unit of analysis itself.
With this transition came an understanding of the organization as a
natural49 and, later, open50 system, one with less clearly-defined
boundaries with its external environment. Far from the series of
formal structures that occupied industrial psychologists in the first
half of the twentieth century, the modern theorist accounts for an
organization’s social structures and their place in a sea of institutions
47. See, e.g., FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT (1911).
48. The Human Relations Movement followed Scientific Management. Relying on field
studies and other anthropological techniques, it introduced social motives and group dynamics
to organization theory. See, e.g., F.J. ROETHLISBERGER & WILLIAM J. DICKSON,
MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER (1939). For examples of field studies, see KURT LEWIN,
FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951); W. LLOYD. WARNER & J.O. LOWE, THE SOCIAL
SYSTEM OF THE MODERN FACTORY (1947). These research techniques, particularly situated
observation, predominated into the 1950s and were used to craft some of the key works in
industrial sociology. See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1955);
ALVIN W. GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY (1954); CHARLES R.
WALKER & ROBERT H. GUEST, THE MAN OF THE ASSEMBLY LINE (1952).
49. The “natural systems” view of organizations examines the interplay of formal
structures, created in the pursuit of efficiency, and informal structures, which embody a variety
of expressions of human sentiment, including communication, reciprocal bonds, and the
expectations that arise from an individual’s role. See, e.g., CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE
FUNCTIONS OF EXECUTIVE (1938); GEORGE C. HOMANS, THE HUMAN GROUP (1950);
ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1957). Philip Selznick best
captured the natural systems view of organizations, demonstrating that they embody
instrumentalist as well as adaptive qualities. Over time, organizations develop their own
character, apart from their use as goal-achieving instruments. They become “infused with value
beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” as they struggle to survive. PHILIP
SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION 17 (1957).
50. The “open systems” perspective followed the rise of operations research and systems
engineering after World War II. It also grew out of efforts to stem the siloing of knowledge
within physics, biology, and the social sciences by focusing on the systems qualities of each
discipline’s key areas of inquiry. See W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL,
NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 82–99 (5th ed. 2003). An organization-as-open-system is a
series of inputs, processes, and knowledge stocks set within environments of varying levels of
stability and uncertainty. Organizations respond to the interdependencies between them and
their environment with a range of strategies, including variation (specialization among subunits
that subsequently require greater coordination) and enactment, the structuring of activities “as
loosely coupled systems of repeated, contingent, interlocked behaviors that establish a
workable level of certainty . . . but also allow variation in interpretation and action as
organizational members selectively attend to their environments.” Joel A.C. Baum & Tim J.
Rowley, Companion to Organizations: An Introduction, in COMPANION TO ORGANIZATIONS
1, 6–7 (Joel A. C. Baum ed., 2002). For an account of the variation strategy, see PAUL
LAWRENCE & JAY LORSCH, ORGANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT (1967). For the enactment
perspective on organizing, see KARL E. WEICK, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZING
(1969).
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that influence what was once viewed as self-contained.51
Organizations respond to this interdependence through strategies
such as variation and enactment, which are discussed below.
Through these responses, organizations allow risks to accumulate
and make predictable mistakes.
The turn to open systems analysis was the Cambrian moment in
organization theory, launching several projects to explain the
organization’s struggles to adapt to and survive within its
environment.52 Each has its own way of navigating the paradox of
organizing, which received a good amount of attention midcentury.
The paradox is twofold. First, the bureaucratic structures that are
formed to address problems have unintended consequences.53
Second, any solutions experience an uneasy duality as they are used
to control, while at the same time they are influenced by, their
institutional environment.54 This means that for organizing to occur,
calculable manipulation and contingent embeddedness must
coexist.55 Two of the most important bodies of work on the
organizational roots of crises, normal accident theory and enacted
sensemaking, emerged directly from the open systems perspective.56
Its concern with information flows and their self-limiting qualities is
important for understanding the post-Valdez regulation of crisis
through contingency planning.

51. W. Richard Scott, Reflections on a Half-Century of Organizational Sociology, 30
ANN. REV. OF SOC. 1, 4–5 (2004).
52. See, e.g., Mie Augier, James G. March & Bilian Ni Sullivan, Notes on the Evolution of
a Research Community: Organization Studies in Anglophone North America, 1945–2000, 16
ORG. SCI. 85 (2005); James G. March, Continuity and Change in Theories of Organizational
Action, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 278 (1996); William McKinley, Mark A. Mone & Gyewan Moon,
Determinants and Development of Schools in Organization Theory, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 634
(1999).
53. Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM.
SOC. REV. 894, 895 (1936).
54. John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure
as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 341 (1977).
55. See Philip Selznick, Foundations of the Theory of Organizations, 13 AM. SOC. REV.
25, 34–35 (1948).
56. See, e.g., CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK
TECHNOLOGIES (1999); Barbara Czarniawska, Karl Weick: Concepts, Style and Reflection, 53
SOC. REV. 267, 271–272 (2005). Both of these perspectives add to our understanding of crisis
because they speak to different kinds of threats to the form and structure of a social system. See
Timothy Hynes & Pushkala Prasad, Patterns of ‘Mock Bureaucracy’ in Mining Disasters: An
Analysis of the Westray Coal Mine Explosion, 34 J. MGMT. STUD. 601, 602 (1997).
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Wielding the organization-as-open-system to implement an
emergency response involves overcoming the paradox of organizing.
The assembly of “ongoing interdependent actions into sensible
sequences”57 is a contradictory enterprise.58 An organization must
balance exploratory activities, such as discovery and innovation, with
exploitative activities, such as production and efficiency, keeping
inertia at bay while fostering economies of scale.59 Existing
approaches must share a space with attempts to innovate.60 Shortterm performance must be pursued with long-term adaptability in
mind. Balancing these interests begins with the twin structural
projects of differentiation and integration: “The act of organizing
creates distinctions of roles and responsibilities, which must be
coordinated and integrated to achieve an overall goal.”61
As with a living organism, an organization develops greater
complexity as it grows, its parts “requir[ing] increasing mutual
interdependence.”62 Subunits are created in response to external
constraints, but they must be pieced together to address certain
tasks.63 This is complicated by the fact that subunits do not relate to
one another in a unified way. They exhibit different levels of
interdependence, and their members develop different attitudes and
orientations over time.64 Each form of interdependence requires its
own coordination methods, including standardization, planning, and
mutual adjustment.65 Whether it is BP, the Coast Guard, a regional
response team, or a group of rescue workers banding together for
the first time, an organization must articulate distinctions among its
members and identify linkages across newly constituted groups in
57. KARL E. WEICK, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZING 3 (1979).
58. JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION: SOCIAL SCIENCE BASES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY 150 (1967).
59. James March, Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning, 2 ORG.
SCI. 71, 71 (1991).
60. Nelson P. Repenning, Understanding Fire Fighting in New Product Development, 18
J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 285, 286 (2001).
61. Wendy K. Smith & Michael L. Tushman, Managing Strategic Contradictions: A Top
Management Model for Managing Innovation Streams, 16 ORG. SCI. 522, 526 (2005).
62. SCOTT A. SNOOK, FRIENDLY FIRE: THE ACCIDENTAL SHOOTDOWN OF U.S. BLACK
HAWKS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ 143 (2000) (quoting HERBERT SPENCER, AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 56 (1904)).
63. Id. at 143.
64. THOMPSON, supra note 58, at 54–56; LAWRENCE & LORSCH, supra note 50, at 9–
11.
65. LAWRENCE & LORSCH, supra note 50, at 9–11.
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order to overcome its inherent complexity.66 These realities lead to
predictable errors and oversights.67
In addition to structural demands, an organization must respond
to the cognitive68 limits on how its workers, managers, and other
members experience and interpret their surroundings. There are two
broad approaches to organizational cognition. First, we can view the
organization as an information processing system.69 Second, and
equally important, we can consider how members interpret the
stream of information entering a system, which depends on the
environment in which the organization finds itself.70 In either
approach, the challenge begins with the fact that the properties of a
complex system cannot be entirely understood by any given person.
They must rely on schemas, which are templates for “representing
elements and the relationships between them” in order to
compensate for cognitive shortcomings by storing information and
indicating appropriate actions.71 Management teams also set out
routines or standard operating procedures for the organization, and
workers develop patterns of interaction in particular settings.72
Schemas, routines, and fixed categories of behavior have strong
effects on an organization’s ability to detect and respond to
unexpected or novel events.73 They can also encourage organizations
to gradually accept greater amounts of risk.74
66. Marshall Scott Poole & Andrew H. Van de Ven, Using Paradox to Build
Management and Organizational Theory, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 562 (1989).
67. For an example of an organizationally-based accident resulting from the failure of
each of the coordination mechanisms Thompson describes, see SNOOK, supra note 62, at 154–
173.
68. Here, I am distinguishing cognitive processes from more affective and emotional
processes, focusing on “reasoning and the preconscious grounds of reason: classifications,
representations, scripts, schemas, production systems, and the like.” Paul J. DiMaggio &
Walter W. Powell, Introduction, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS 1, 35 n.10 (1991); see also W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS 23 (1995).
69. For an overview, see Theresa K. Lant, Organizational Cognition and Interpretation,
in COMPANION TO ORGANIZATIONS 344 (Joel A.C. Baum ed., 2002).
70. Id. at 351–52.
71. Kimberly D. Elsbach, Pamela S. Barr & Andrew B. Hargadon, Identifying Situated
Cognition in Organizations, 16 ORG. SCI. 422, 422 (2005).
72. See Stephen R. Barley & Pamela S. Tolbert, Institutionalization and Structuration:
Studying the Links Between Action and Institution, 18 ORG. STUD. 93, 97–98 (1997). For a
discussion of how routines lead organizations to uphold inefficient practices in the context of
industrial accidents, see Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete
Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 863 (2010).
73. Karl Weick, Organizing and Failures of Imagination, 8 INT’L PUB. MGMT. J. 425,
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To find out whether an organization will have difficulty
responding to a crisis, we focus on the complex, open system and
how it comes to know and interpret information from its
environment; how it stores knowledge in procedures, norms, rules,
and other sources of cognition that transcend the individual; and
how patterns of understanding form among its actors as well as
across organizations. These structural and cognitive considerations
inform how organizations invite and intensify disaster. The BP oil
spill provides a dramatic example of how the organizational roots of
crisis are reproduced during a response action.
III. THE ILL-FATED MACONDO WELL: AN INDUSTRIAL CRISIS
I need not take much space to return to the devastation that
befell the Gulf region, a diverse ecosystem that includes everything
from sperm whales to fishing villages,75 in April 2010. On April 20,
there was an explosion on an offshore oil platform known as the
Deepwater Horizon, forty-eight miles southeast of the Mississippi
River.76 The dynamically stabilized (not anchored to the seabed)
platform, built by Hyundai, owned by Transocean,77 and leased to
BP, sat partially submerged about 5,000 feet above the sea floor.78
This is by no means an uncommon scene in the Gulf of Mexico:

431–33 (2005).
74. Diane Vaughan, Theorizing Disaster: Analogy, Historical Ethnography, and the
Challenger Accident, 5 ETHNOGRAPHY 315, 340 (2004).
75. ROWAN JACOBSEN, SHADOWS ON THE GULF: A JOURNEY THROUGH OUR LAST
GREAT WETLAND 92 (2011).
76. For book-length accounts of the disaster, see JOEL ACHENBACH, A HOLE AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE SEA: THE RACE TO KILL THE BP OIL GUSHER (2011); BOB CAVNAR,
DISASTER ON THE HORIZON: HIGH STAKES, HIGH RISKS, AND THE STORY BEHIND THE
DEEPWATER WELL BLOWOUT (2010); WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG & ROBERT GRAMLING,
BLOWOUT IN THE GULF: THE BP OIL SPILL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF ENERGY IN
AMERICA (2011); PETER LEHNER & BOB DEANS, IN DEEP WATER: THE ANATOMY OF A
DISASTER, THE FATE OF THE GULF, AND ENDING OUR OIL ADDICTION (2010).
77. Of the companies with a stake in the exploratory drilling of the Macondo well,
Transocean Ltd. is most consistent in its efforts to deflect responsibility for the blowout,
focusing in its internal investigation on BP’s risk-magnifying decisions and Halliburton’s failure
to ensure the integrity of the cement used to secure steel pipe against the sides of the wellbore.
BP’s internal investigation was more circumspect. See TRANSOCEAN LTD., MACONDO WELL
INCIDENT: TRANSOCEAN INVESTIGATION REPORT VOLUME I (June 2011), available at
http://www.deepwater.com/_filelib/FileCabinet/pdfs/ 00_TRANSOCEAN_Vol_1.pdf.
78. CUTLER CLEVELAND, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL (C. MICHAEL HOGAN &
PETER
SAUNDRY
eds.,
2010),
available
at
http://www.eoearth.org/article/
Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill?topic=50364.
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there are 1,900 ultra-deepwater leases in the region, 272 of which
have been drilled.79 Each requires drilling at depths greater than
5,000 feet.80 The Deepwater Horizon joined this eerie skyline in
February 2010, connecting to a well roughly one mile below the
surface using several thousand feet of pipe, after another rig, the
Marianas, was damaged by a hurricane.81
From the platform, workers carried out operations through the
pipe, which is called a riser. Their tasks were enormous: Send a drill
bit down the riser into a metal box on the sea floor, which then drills
into the sediment. Follow the drill bit with drilling mud, a mixture
of water, clay, and other substances, circulating it down the riser and
back up to the platform to bring rock to the surface and lubricate the
drillbit.82 Gradually insert steel casings into the well as drilling
continues, cementing them to surrounding rock at various stages in
order to keep them in place.83 These and other tasks, at such depths,
demand some of the most complex work carried out by any industry.
In order to accomplish such tasks, BP and other owners and
operators need to develop technologies to withstand very low
temperatures; near the seafloor, ice crystals form around methane
molecules, creating hydrates that can clog pipes and equipment.84
Technology is also needed to combat exceedingly high pressures in
various ways.85 Much of the work is done using remotely operated
vehicles. The semisubmersible rig holds its ground using eight 7,000
horsepower thrusters and GPS technology “so precise that its drills
[can] hit a specific spot on the ocean floor, just inches in diameter,
but located nearly a mile below.”86
Of greatest concern is that there will be a blowout, which is a
loss of control over drilling fluids leading to the release of oil or gas
to surrounding waters.87 The dangers were well-known by the
79. CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41262,
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf.
80. Id.
81. LEHNER & DEANS, supra note 76, at 6; ACHENBACH, supra note 76, at 14.
82. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 76, at 28–31.
83. Id. at 28–30.
84. PETER FOLGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22990, GAS HYDRATES: RESOURCE
AND HAZARD 1 (2008).
85. HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note 79.
86. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 76, at x.
87. MARC HUMPHRIES, ROBERT PIROG & GENE WHITNEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40645, U.S. OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS RESOURCES: PROSPECTS AND PROCESSES 24 (2010).
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industry, including BP.88 For example, prior to the Deepwater
Horizon’s demise, there were forty-four notable blowouts
worldwide. This included eleven blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico,
occurring at a rate of roughly one every four years.89 Blowout
preventer failures were also common. A blowout preventer is a giant
piece of equipment that is supposed to seal around a wellhead in the
event of an uncontrolled fluid event. A study by the Minerals
Management Service identified 117 failures during a two-year period
on the Outer Continental Shelf.90 Some of the environmental review
documents covering the area of the Macondo well gave strangely
prescient estimates for the size of a potential well blowout and the
length of time necessary to drill a relief well, and discussed problems
presented by methane hydrates and other deepwater drilling
realities.91 But none of the firms with a stake in Mississippi Canyon
Block 252, Lease Sale 206, were prepared for what happened on
April 20.
At the bottom of the Gulf, far below the Deepwater Horizon oil
platform, sat the well’s blowout preventer (BOP). Should an oil or
gas well experience too much pressure, this device, which contains a
series of valves weighing several hundred tons, is supposed to be
activated.92 There are several backup systems on BOPs that can
respond to a number of contingencies. Each of them failed to engage
the BOP on April 20, when methane gas escaped from the well and
rapidly ascended through the drill column, ballooning in size as it
neared the surface.93 It crashed through several seals before
88. For example, BP suffered a blowout on a gas platform in Azerbaijan in 2008. Similar
to the Macondo well blowout, the accident was blamed on a “bad cement job” by
Halliburton, a contractor on both projects. Confidential Cable from Embassy Baku,
Azerbaijan: BP Downbeat on 2009 Shah Deniz Phase Two Progress (Jan. 15, 2009), available
at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09BAKU30 (“BP has restarted oil
production from CA and is about to start re-injecting gas again in the Central Azeri field. It
has closed off a ‘few suspect wells’ from which they think a bad cement job caused the leaking
gas . . . .”).
89. Houck, supra note 37, at 11,034.
90. PER HOLAND, SINTEF, RELIABILITY OF SUBSEA BOP SYSTEMS FOR DEEPWATER
APPLICATION, PHASE II DW 11–12 (1999).
91. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GULF OF MEXICO
DEEPWATER OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 9, II-3, II-16
(2000); BP, BP GULF OF MEXICO REGIONAL OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN 533 (2009)
[hereinafter BP REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN] available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/
BPGoMspillresponseplan.pdf.
92. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 92–93.
93. Id. at 131–32, 137–38, 146, 149–50, 159–67, 273. There were also failures of the
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exploding, causing chaos and fires to break out on the rig. Of the
126 people operating on the platform, a tiny floating city, 115
evacuated.94 A search for the remaining eleven persons was called off
three days later. The rig sank to the bottom of the Gulf, and the
giant pipe that connected the Deepwater Horizon to the wellhead
collapsed into the sea.
Three days later, remotely operated vehicles scanned the riser
and discovered two leaks.95 Thus began one of the most difficult
emergency response efforts since the dawn of the fossil fuel
economy. It involved at its height over 6,000 vessels, millions of feet
of boom, 37,000 personnel, seventeen staging areas in four states,
and a “Unified Command” encompassing over a dozen federal
agencies.96 Several attempts to stop the leak failed, followed by a
promising procedure in June in which a cap was placed over the
BOP after giant shears severed it from the riser.97 The operation
allowed BP to recover some oil from a containment system attached
to the BOP. A number of valves were then closed on the cap,
pending tests for pressure, hydrate formation, and other indicators.98
On July 15, eighty-six days after the release began, crude oil stopped
flowing into the Gulf.99
We will be grappling with the extent of the devastation for some
time. To begin with, the size of the spill is the subject of much
controversy. The Coast Guard initially estimated a leak of 1,000
barrels of oil per day.100 A National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) scientist later encouraged Unified
Command to raise this estimate to 5,000 barrels per day on April
28.101 That figure remained until late May, when estimates between
20,000 and 100,000 barrels per day were given during congressional
testimony.102 Part of the reason for the disparity in estimates lies in
cement at the base of the well and the drilling mud in the well to contain hydrocarbon
pressure. Id. at 115–21.
94. Id. at 3, 17, 131.
95. Id. at 131–32.
96. CLEVELAND, supra note 78.
97. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 145–46,
148–50, 157–60, 161–67.
98. Id. at 161–67.
99. Id. at 165.
100. Id. at 133.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 146–47.
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the methods used to estimate the size of the spill.103 Nevertheless, to
release more oil than the Macondo well sent into the Gulf would
require the work of a national army, such as when Iraqi forces
opened and set fire to 700 wells as they retreated from Kuwait in
1991.104
The disaster defied many confident claims that BP made to
regulators prior to the spill, thus unveiling the symbolic nature of
environmental review. BP’s Regional Oil Spill Response Plan for the
Gulf, approved by the U. S. Minerals Management Service (MMS) in
July 2009, reveals the faulty logic involved in contingency plans. The
bureaucracies that promulgate these documents are only effective
during periods of continuous and stable operation. Because crises
occur too infrequently to allow an organization to gauge risk, there
is a tendency to lock in existing routines, which are an organization’s
primary tool for simplifying decisions, and interpret past success as
evidence of their adequacy.105 Organizations do so using “fantasy
documents,” which are plans for events that are not perceived as
credible threats and that rarely test the plans’ unrealistic models for
how organizations behave under stress.106
BP and the MMS engaged in such planning. They assumed the
likelihood of a catastrophic blowout was not significant, waiving
BOP plans. Procedures and equipment for response to a worst-case
blowout were deemed readily available. BP’s response plan spoke of
“significant mechanical recovery capacity.”107 While the projected
worst-case blowout would pump 250,000 barrels per day into the
Gulf, BP’s plan arrived at a capacity to recover 491,000 barrels of oil
per day.108 By June 2010, its skimming capacity reached 900 barrels
per day.109 Another benign assumption involved the chance that oil
could reach the Louisiana coast. BP’s plan assumed a twenty-one
103. Id. at 147.
104. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 76, at 13.
105. Lee Clarke & James F. Short, Jr., Social Organization and Risk: Some Current
Controversies, 19 ANN. REV. SOC. 375, 392–93 (1993).
106. Lee Clarke & Charles Perrow, Prosaic Organizational Failure, 39 AM. BEHAVIORAL
SCIENTIST 1040 (1996). These documents have common characteristics: they deal with new or
scaled-up systems such as deepwater drilling, use successfully implemented blueprints for
simpler contingencies, cover a wide range of events with every possible contingency assumed
known, and speak to multiple, skeptical audiences by employing benign assumptions. LEE
CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE: USING FANTASY DOCUMENTS TO TAME DISASTER (1999).
107. BP REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 91, at 504-48.
108. Id. at 509.
109. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 76, at 14.
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percent chance that this would happen within a month of a
blowout.110 Crude oil reached the state nine days after the blowout.
Such estimates were presented despite the fact that the fate and
transport of oil released a mile under the surface is beyond the reach
of dispersion modeling. Yet planning proceeded, relying on past
successes (such as the use of containment domes for shallow water
leaks after Hurricane Katrina); hypothetically scaling up procedures
for shallow water or surface spills and ignoring subsurface realities of
deepwater drilling; assuming away multiple stressors that accompany
a worst-case scenario (shoreline threats, adverse effects on marine
life, uncertain authority over decisions, personnel changes) and
neglecting to determine how a responsible party would act under
such stress; preapproving dispersants based on the assumption that a
response action would be limited in time and space; treating the
BOP as a failsafe even though it included one, not two blind shear
rams; and encouraging the kinds of rigidities of perception that we
find in organizational settings. Aided by the self-deceiving quality of
fantasy plans, the broader mindset in the petroleum industry, even
after the Gulf oil spill was underway, was that “[t]his was simply an
event that could not happen.”111
Media saturation and Web 2.0 took the Macondo well blowout,
and the fire, collapse, and riser leaks that followed, and seared them
into our collective consciousness. Traffic to a live feed of one of the
leaks, taken by camera-mounted remotely operated vehicles and
available on the Internet one month after the blowout, crashed the
House Select Committee for Energy Independence and Global
Warming’s website.112 The “spillcam,” as it was called, adorned cable
news broadcasts, often next to dreary updates that moved along the
crawl at the bottom of the screen. At one point, the spillcam caught
an eel as it drifted in for a closer look before darting away to
safety.113
In the ensuing weeks, the spillcam, and interpretations of the
images it captured, mediated the efforts of BP (the responsible party)
and a vast architecture of laws and regulations that lumbered into
110. Id. at 54.
111. Houck, supra note 37, at 11033.
112. CLEVELAND, supra note 78.
113. Eel Checks Out Deepwater Oil Leak, THE GUARDIAN (June 10, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/video/2010/jun/10/eel-deepwater-horizon-oilleak.
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action. We learned plenty during the 103 days before the well was
effectively “killed,” as the Coast Guard and other agencies worked
closely with BP to invent responses “on the fly.”114 The most
disquieting lesson, in an age where natural, man-made, and natech115 crises occur with great frequency and where terrorism has
muscled its way alongside the hurricanes and accidents of old as an
object of legislative reform, is how slowly the law learns from its
experience with the organizational factors that magnify and prolong
disasters. Organizational breakdown was clear, pervasive, and
predictable before and during the oil well blowout.116 Some of the
lessons from the BP oil spill have a ring of familiarity to students of
disasters, such as the loss of the shuttles Challenger and Columbia
and the events of 9/11. Yet lawmakers undertheorize the
importance of organizations in environmental regulation, particularly
during times of crisis.
The aftermath of the spill signifies a rush to remedy what are
perceived as the standard contributors to crisis. To avoid conflicts of
interest between the Outer Continental Shelf leasing program and
staff charged with policing oil and gas operations, the lead oversight
agency (the Minerals Management Service) was split into three
distinct bureaus and consolidated under the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement.117 Certain categorical
exclusions from environmental review were eliminated.118 Through
114. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling,
Stopping the Spill: the Five-Month Effort to Kill the Macondo Well 1 (Staff Working Paper No. 6,
2011) [hereinafter Working Paper No. 6], available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Containment%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
115. Stacy Young, Lina Balluz & Josephine Malilay, Natural and Technologic Hazardous
Material Releases During and After Natural Disasters: A Review, 322 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 3
(2004).
116. In addition to the overconfidence encouraged by the creation of facility response
plans, pre-blowout dynamics included atrophy of vigilance, normalization of risk, and parallel
processing. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 76.
117. U.S. SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3299, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUREAU
OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE (2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=324
75; Memorandum from Michael R. Bromwich, Director, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt.,
Enforcement and Regulation, to all BOEMRE district employees 1–4 (2010); Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions (May 19,
2010).
118. Memorandum from Michael R. Bromwich, Director, Bureau of Ocean Energy
Mgmt., Enforcement and Regulation, to Walter Cruickshank, Deputy Director, Bureau of
Ocean Energy Mgmt., Enforcement and Regulation 1 (Aug. 16, 2010).
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rulemaking and notices to lessees, the Department of Interior sought
to impose new redundancies of control, information disclosure
requirements regarding blowout preventer functionality, operator
and drilling safety regulations, and third-party equipment
verification.119 There were calls to enhance training and recruit a
proper cadre of inspectors.120 Bills before Congress would extend
many of these fixes.121 In addition to these reforms, the presidential
119. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Safety and
Environmental Management Systems: Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,609, 63,610 (Oct. 15,
2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) (final rule requiring operators to “integrate a
comprehensive [Safety and Environmental Management System] program into the
management of their [Outer Continental Shelf] operations”); Oil and Gas and Sulphur
Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf – Increased Safety Measures for Energy
Development on the Outer Continental Shelf: Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,345 (Oct. 14,
2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) (strengthening regulations for subsea and surface
blowout preventers, well casing and cementing, secondary intervention, unplanned
disconnects, recordkeeping, and well completion); BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL NO. 2010-N10,
NATIONAL NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF 1–2 (2010) (requiring submission of information demonstrating that an
operator using BOPs “has access to and can deploy surface and subsea containment resources
that would be adequate to promptly respond to a blowout or other loss of well control”);
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT, FACT SHEET: THE
DRILLING SAFETY RULE 1–2, available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=45792 (describing BOEM’s interim Drilling
Safety Rule imposing requirements on well bore integrity and well control equipment and
procedures); MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL NO. 2010-N05,
NATIONAL NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS): INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON
THE OCS 1, 2–6 (2010) (implementing reporting requirements for “BOP stacks and loss of
well control events,” as well as third party certification, new testing requirements, and well
design requirements); MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL NO.
2010-N06, NATIONAL NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS
LEASES, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS): INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
EXPLORATION PLANS, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PLANS, AND DEVELOPMENT
OPERATIONS COORDINATION DOCUMENTS ON THE OCS 2–3 (2010) (requiring submission
of information to MMS on potential well blowout and worst-case discharge scenarios).
120. Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement,
BOEMRE Strengthens Offshore Inspections Program (June 13, 2011).
121. See, e.g., H.R. 1890, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring applicants for exploration plans
or development plans in the Outer Continental Shelf to submit an oil spill containment and
clean-up plan); H.R. 1870, 112th Cong. (2011) (creating new entities within the Department
of Interior); H.R. 1664, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending requirements for oil spill response
plans and water quality monitoring); H.R. 1393, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring mandatory
monthly inspections of offshore drilling facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf); H.R. 1229,
112th Cong. (2011) (as passed by the House, May 11, 2011) (requiring operators to
demonstrate compliance with safety systems, including blowout prevention and oil spill
response and containment before the Dept. of Interior issuance of drilling permits); H.R.
3534, 111th Cong. (2010) (as passed by the House, July 30, 2010) (requiring use of safe well
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commission added that coordination should be improved among
high-level officials and that more extensive procedures for Spills of
National Significance should be adopted.122 Their report echoes
earlier calls for a “culture of safety” among operators, through use of
a “safety case” instead of a prescriptive approach.123 Better
coordination, increasingly intricate procedures, and more data with
oversight by independent, better-trained staff is the order of the day.
IV. NCP V. DWH: THE RESPONSE ARCHITECTURE’S IGNORANCE
OF ORGANIZATIONS
Such changes mark the tail end of twenty years of regulatory
accretion. The federal response to disaster during this time has been
to create organizations that focus on civil contingencies, new or
reorganized bureaucracies demanding greater coordination,
enhanced procedures, and more data sharing. This began in earnest
with the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan (NCP),124 published in response to the Torrey
Canyon oil spill in 1968, amended to cover hazardous substance spill
response, and revised after Exxon Valdez to reflect provisions of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990.125 The NCP creates a number of bodies
to carry out response functions at the national, regional, and area
levels.126 A National Response Team cobbles together sixteen
control technologies and practices for drilling); S. 3516, 111th Cong. (2010) (as reported by
S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, July 28, 2010) (reforming the regulatory
oversight of the Interior Department with regard to offshore drilling in the Outer Continental
Shelf).
122. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 267–68.
123. Id. at 223.
124. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. §
300 (2010). For a summary of the NCP, see National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency
Plan
Overview,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2011).
125. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (The purpose of the NCP is “to provide organizational
structure and procedures for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of
hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants.”). Presidential creation of the NCP is
required by § 311(d) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“Clean Water Act”), 33
U.S.C. § 1321(d) as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380, and by
Section 105 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2006), as amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The
President delegated the authority to amend the NCP to the administrator of the EPA. Exec.
Order, No. 12777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (Oct. 22, 1991).
126. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.210(a)–(c), 300.105(c) (2010). The NRT does not become
actively involved in a response action that is manageable by Regional Response Teams (RRT),
instead offering policy, guidance, and coordination efforts, for instance in the creation of
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agencies and is chaired by the EPA and vice-chaired by the Coast
Guard.127 Regional Response Teams mirror the National Response
Team in composition. They function at the regional level and
actively engage in response efforts.128 Area Committees required by
the Clean Water Act also include members from industry and are the
primary functional units of response planning, implementing more
specific and detailed plans for a physical response to oil spills.129 For
the Gulf region, the Area Committee formulated the Area
Contingency Plan, or “One Gulf Plan,” a coordinated effort to
envision and prepare for events as they might occur on the ground.
An On-Scene Coordinator directs and oversees response efforts
and coordinates all other efforts at the release site.130 When a spill
poses a substantial threat to public health or welfare, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard may classify it as a Spill of National
Significance and appoint someone to coordinate even greater federal
involvement. The National Incident Commander assumes the role of
On-Scene Coordinator and oversees all levels of response.131 For the
Deepwater Horizon spill, Admiral Thad Allen filled this role by
forming a Unified Area Command, an ad hoc body to supervise the
broader effort,132 while three Incident Command posts in Houma,
Regional Contingency Plans (RCPs). Because of the severity and cross-district nature of the BP
oil spill, the NRT was activated as an emergency response team as part of the nationalized
response. 40 C.F.R. § 300.110(j)(1)(i–ii) (2010).
127. During a response action, the chair is the agency providing an On-Scene
Coordinator. The Coast Guard provides On-Scene Coordinators for oil discharges within
coastal waters and was therefore the NRT’s chair for the Deepwater Horizon response. 40
C.F.R § 300.120(a)(1) (2010).
128. 40 C.F.R § 300.205(b) (2010). RRTs are limited to regional resources of
represented federal agencies (Coast Guard vessels, for example). 40 C.F.R § 300.115(f)
(2010). However, RRTs also include state and local representation. 40 C.F.R §§ 300.115(a),
300.180 (2010). The RRT is composed of a standing team of members of participating federal
agencies, state governments, local governments, and incident-specific teams when the RRT is
activated for a response. Membership in incident-specific teams is dictated by the nature of the
incident. 40 C.F.R. § 300.115(b)–(e) (2010).
129. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.205(c), 300.210(c) (2010).
130. 40 C.F.R. § 300.120(a) (2010). For coastal releases, the Coast Guard has
predesignated On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs). OSCs collect information and communicate it
to appropriate persons and agencies as well as the public. 40 C.F.R § 300.135(c)–(n),
300.155(a)–(c) (2010).
131. 40 C.F.R. § 300.323(c) (2010). The OSC continues to operate after installation of
an NIC, although their relationship and defined roles are not well-defined in the NCP.
132. The organizations involved in the Deepwater Horizon response’s Unified Command
included BP, Transocean, the Coast Guard, Minerals Management Service, NOAA, EPA,
Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, Department of Defense, Fish
and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Department of State, U.S. Geological Survey, and
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Louisiana; Houston, Texas; and Mobile, Alabama made tactical and
operational decisions.133
The NCP is the federal government’s “playbook,”134 a massive
assignment of procedures, roles, equipment levels, techniques, and
schedules. It mirrors the perceived lessons of disasters like Exxon
Valdez as it consolidates expertise, expands procedures, and assigns
responsibilities. The events of 9/11 ushered in a more gargantuan
surge of reorganization, whose premise bears a striking resemblance
to the justification for the NCP. First, bring together disparate,
diverse units, this time under the Department of Homeland
Security.135 Second, increase coordination among agencies and
branches, including among fifty-six FBI field offices, and acquire and
share a greater amount of information. Lastly, build out standard
operating procedures to meet an expanding set of contingencies in
an evolving threat environment, such as by updating protocols to
address multiple or suicide hijackings as opposed to traditional
hijackings.136
Below, I discuss what is neglected in these efforts, which
represent the state-of-the-art in environmental crisis management.
The Macondo well blowout illustrates crucial, cutting-edge problems
in organization theory, particularly interorganizational limits to
rationality and how to manage organizational cognition. In the Gulf
of Mexico in the summer of 2010, the post-9/11 emergency

OSHA.
133. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
Decision-Making Within the Unified Command 4 (Staff Working Paper No. 2, 2010)
[hereinafter Working Paper No. 2], available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
134. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 30 (1980).
135. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002);
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/HSPD-5
(2003) [hereinafter HSPD-5] (making DHS the principal federal agency for “terrorist attacks,
major disasters, and other emergencies” and outlining agency obligations).
136. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) “provide[s] a consistent
nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments,” a single system of
management for domestic emergencies. HSPD-5, supra note 135, at § 15. NIMS Component
IV codifies the Incident Command System, itself a small bureaucracy with command,
operations, planning, logistics, and finance sections. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM § IV.A.2 (2008) [hereinafter NIMS]. Together,
HSPD-5 and NIMS lay out the response architecture that prosecuted what officials understood
as a “war” against the Macondo well. They invoke the structures and procedures of the NCP
and require assembly of a Unified Command for multi-jurisdictional response. NIMS §
IV.A.2.a(2).
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response laws were set in motion. Government organized teams of
scientists and engineers who “took a crash course in petroleum
engineering and were able over time to provide substantive oversight
of BP.”137 BP worked on building “novel devices” that they
confidently lowered into the Gulf while the government “had to
mobilize personnel on the fly.”138 We see two strands of activity here:
design/build of new containment methods and a lurching toward
appropriate oversight, for which the National Response Framework
provided a limited map. The insights of organization theory help
explain the “failure of response systems to improve alongside
advances in exploration technology”139 that haunted the response
effort. This Article discusses six dynamics that were reproduced by
the response system awakened by the BP oil spill. These dynamics,
which contributed to the failure to more swiftly rein in the blowout,
go beyond the narratives that dominate standard regulatory accounts
of accidents. They point to how multiagency response can intensify
the paradox of organizing.
A. Interorganizational Dynamics
1. Anarchy
The NCP and other contingency planning efforts intensify the
challenges of balancing differentiation and integration while tending
to organizational cognition. This is true by virtue of the interorganizational anarchies that they create and try to govern. No
matter how many standard operating procedures are built out or
agencies are consolidated and told to share information, disaster
response will occur under conditions of dramatic uncertainty. For
example, during the BP oil spill, the use of dispersants to break oil
into trillions of tiny droplets to keep much of it from reaching
coastal wetlands had to be approved for subsea use near the
wellhead.140 This had to proceed with little or no data on
environmental persistence, sublethal effects (such as endocrine

137. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 1.
138. Id.
139. Memorandum, supra note 15, at 13.
140. Press Release, Restore the Gulf, Coast Guard and EPA Approve Use of Dispersant
Subsea in Further Effort to Prevent Oil from Reaching U.S. Shoreline (May 15, 2010),
available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/05/15/coast-guard-and-epsapprove-use-dispersant-subsea-further-effort-prevent-oil-reac/.

2088

DO NOT DELETE

2063

12/20/2011 3:07 PM

The Paradox of Organizing

disruption), or toxicity.141 Dispersants were preauthorized as part of
the NCP but without guidance as to the appropriate amount or
duration of use.142 Decisions about what became high-volume,
subsea dispersant application were made in narrow time frames
without the chance to gather sufficient data.143 Responders also
wanted to place boom along coastal ecosystems and tried to direct its
placement where it would be most efficient.144 But because coastal
areas change with great frequency, determining specific booming
maps ahead of a crisis is impossible.145 These and other sources of
ambiguity rendered goals unclear at a number of points during the
war on the Macondo well.
Well control and containment, which were supervised by MMS
officials, and later the Unified Command,146 provide examples of the
unclear goals that informed the response. At first, the concern was
well integrity.147 BP workers delayed intervention with remotely
operated vehicles for twenty hours because they were worried that
closing the BOP stack and shutting in the well might cause an
underground blowout, where vast amounts of hydrocarbons would
escape into surrounding rock.148 Other times, decisions were guided
by goals such as positioning ships at a safe distance from the fire or
by concerns for human health due to concentrations of volatile
organic compounds near response vessels or the shoreline.149

141. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 144–45,
270–71; Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, The Use
of Surface and Subsea Dispersants During the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 1–2 (Staff
Working Paper No. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Working Paper No. 4], available at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Dispersants
%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
142. Working Paper No. 4, supra note 141, at 4; see DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 271.
143. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 144–45,
270–71.
144. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling,
Decision-Making Within the Unified Command 18 (Staff Working Paper No. 2, 2011)
[hereinafter Working Paper No. 2], available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
145. Id. at 21; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at
154.
146. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 1.
147. Id. at 3.
148. Id. at 3–4.
149. Id. at 4.
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Objectives shifted over time. After the “top kill” method failed
to stop the flow of oil, BP concluded that it did not work because
mud pumped into the well had moved through collapsed rupture
disks and sideways into the rock, rather than remaining in the well
and pushing hydrocarbons back into the reservoir.150 This caused
capping methods, including the capping stack that ultimately
stopped the flow of oil into the Gulf, to be shelved because of well
integrity concerns.151 Later, when the capping stack was again
considered a viable option, monitoring protocols had to be
developed, combining visual, seismic, sonar, wellhead pressure, and
other data.152 This raised several questions: Would well integrity tests
signal the need to reopen the spill to avoid an underground
blowout? What threshold would signal the need to take such an
action? And how would it be decided?153
In addition to goal ambiguity, and despite the militaristic
hierarchy set in place by the NCP and other documents, response
participants and their assigned roles varied considerably over time.
The federal oversight structure matured through late June.154 Early
on, MMS focused its attention on safety risks and ensuring
conformity with MMS regulations, not on suggesting options or
determining their likelihood of success.155 The Coast Guard did not
take charge of the scene or even lead the fire fighting effort, as
neither were part of its primary mission.156 Eventually, a rudimentary
chain of command formed, with BP detailing new procedures, MMS
and Coast Guard staff in Houston identifying and mitigating
hazards, procedures being forwarded to the Unified Command in
Louisiana with an MMS Gulf of Mexico director reviewing those
procedures, and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator giving final
approval.157 It was not until two months into the crisis that a
formalized government review process was in place, with the U.S.
Geological Survey and teams from several national laboratories
providing information and analysis.158 Additional teams of scientists
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 2829.
Id.
Id. at 1415, 2425.
Id. at 6.
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 130.
Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 6.
Id. at 14–15.
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not envisioned by the response plans, such as the Well Integrity
Team and the Flow Rate Technical Group, were formed rapidly.159
Throughout this time period, there was little clarity as to the
extent and nature of government oversight with respect to certain
classes of issues.160 Role ambiguity abounded as positions and
responsibilities were grafted onto existing frameworks.161
Organizational charts for the Unified Area Command and Incident
Command posts, for example, show employees of BP scattered
across the command structure in roles such as waste management
and environmental assessment.162 Admiral Allen, who decided to
focus on monitoring high-level strategy and political issues himself,
defined the role of the National Incident Commander on the job.163
From existing procedures it was unclear how he and the On-Scene
Coordinator should divide responsibility.164 The National and
Regional Response Teams were activated and later marginalized,
becoming report-to instead of decision-making bodies.165 Agency
administrators took on evolving responsibilities and issued joint
directives.166 Industry leaders from firms other than BP assumed an
active role in mid-to-late June, providing advice on conference calls
of thirty or more.167 State-level actors did not know how to interact
with the NCP, which is more interventionist than the federal relief
provided under the Stafford Act (which provides funding and
coordination when an emergency is declared at the state level).168
The essential technologies of emergency response, which
included the instruments and techniques of well control and available

159. Id. at 1314, 2728.
160. Id. at 13–15, 24–27.
161. Id.
162. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 134.
163. Working Paper No. 2, supra note 144, at 5.
164. Id. at 3–6.
165. Id. at 8–9.
166. See generally DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at
ch. 5 (outlining the response to the Gulf Oil Disaster); Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114
(outlining the effort to contain the Macondo blowout).
167. See, e.g., Thad Allen, Nat’l Incident Commander for the Deepwater BP Oil Spill,
Press Briefing Regarding the Deepwater BP Oil Spill (June 21, 2010), http://
www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/06/21/transcript-press-briefing-national-incidentcommander-june-21-2010 (describing conference calls and the involvement of BP in the
ongoing containment efforts); DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra
note 26, at 16162; Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 1415.
168. Working Paper No. 2, supra note 144, at 1819.
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routines and institutionalized modes of conduct, were further illdefined.169 Some of the proposed solutions to the well blowout,
which included cofferdam, top kill, junk shot, capping stack, static
kill, and collection, were adapted to deepwater use for the first
time.170 Other more rule-based technologies, such as standard
operating procedures previously developed and based on welldefined problems culled from previous crises, were inappropriate for
this particular spill response, yet the decisions that they facilitated
allowed other risks to accumulate. For example, the Coast Guard has
procedures for supporting the fire marshal brought in by a company
with a rig fire. However, in the chaos surrounding the events before
the rig’s collapse, no fire marshal was called.171 With no one in
charge, vessels responding to the fire poured seawater onto its decks
rather than on the columns supporting the rig.172 As a result, the
tons of seawater applied to the deck upset the rig’s stability and
potentially hastened its collapse.173 If the rig had stayed afloat, much
of the oil would have burned at the surface.
Later, faith in existing procedures led the Unified Command to
neglect some of the key operational hazards associated with BP’s
containment efforts.174 Specifically, as the cofferdam was readied to
surround the larger of two riser leaks, no effort was made to
determine how to mitigate hydrate formation within equipment as it
was being installed.175 There were procedures for dealing with
hydrates once a containment structure was in place, but not
before.176 Hydrates accumulated in the cofferdam while it was being
169. See generally DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at
ix; Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling,
Response/Clean-up Technology Research & Development and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
(Staff Working Paper No. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Working Paper No. 7], available at
http://tinyurl.com/6mkt8cf.
170. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 145–53;
Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 716. For depictions of some of the proposed
solutions to the blowout, see Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 9 (cofferdam), 16 (top
kill and junk shot), 27 (capping stack), 35 (static kill), and 22 (collection).
171. U.S. COAST GUARD, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE EXPLOSION, FIRE, SINKING AND LOSS OF ELEVEN CREW MEMBERS
ABOARD THE MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT, DEEPWATER HORIZON IN THE GULF OF
MEXICO 78–79 (2011), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=6700.
172. Id. at 78–81.
173. Id. at 81–82.
174. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 47.
175. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 145.
176. Id.
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lowered into the Gulf.177 Because hydrates are lighter than water,
they rendered the structure buoyant, sending a giant flammable
dome toward a surface strewn with response vessels.178
As disaster scholars have repeatedly warned about the
“incubation period” that precedes crises, the effects of poorly
defined technologies and an accumulation of errors were similarly
manifest in the early response efforts in the Gulf. For example, BP
and other parties tried to control the blowout preventer stack until
May 5, by which date they were only able to partially close the blind
shear ram.179 These were largely misdirected efforts because
Transocean had earlier reconfigured the equipment so that what the
parties thought was the blind shear ram was actually a test ram.180
More importantly, the lack of an accurate flow-rate estimate
hindered use of existing and refined technologies.181 Efforts such as
placing a cofferdam over a riser leak were known to have little chance
of success if the flow rate were greater than 15,000 barrels per day.182
For the top kill, given planned pumping rates, the procedure was not
likely to work if it were counteracting a 13,000- to 15,000-barrelper-day blowout.183 In addition, hydrates are more likely to form on
equipment as the flow volume increases.184 A ship brought in to
collect oil from containment structures could process only 15,000
barrels per day.185 Models of hydrate formation and collection
abilities proceeded without accurate flow estimates.186 For much of
May 2010, the only official flow-rate estimate was 5,000 barrels per
day.187 The flow rate was closer to 60,000 barrels per day.
There is a decision-making model for environments characterized
by unclear goals, ill-defined technology, and shifting participation.
This model challenges the view of organizations as rational entities

177. Id.
178. Id. at 146.
179. Id. at 137–38.
180. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 8.
181. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 146–47;
Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 11–12.
182. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 11–12.
183. Id. at 16; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at
150.
184. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 146.
185. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 11–12.
186. Id. at 11.
187. Id.
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and extends the work of the Carnegie school on bounded
cognition.188 In it, “[p]roblems, solutions, participants, and choice
opportunities . . . are frequently uncoupled and recombined in
organizational settings for reasons of timing and chance rather than
based on administrative forethought.”189 This occurs under
conditions of what Cohen, March, and Olsen dub “organized
anarchy.”190 A primary preoccupation of organizations is to replace
ambiguous goals with “more specific, proximal, and often procedural
goal statements” in order to reduce uncertainty.191 How these goals
are then addressed is contingent: the specific decision-making
context and choice opportunities that it presents, the participants
who are assembled, and other characteristics of an organization’s
structure bring together solutions and problems. New
institutionalism is largely devoted to studying what happens in these
settings, as organizationally-defined solutions seek problems in order
to reduce uncertainty and ensure an organization’s legitimacy.192
While some scholarship questions how contingent such decisions
will ultimately be,193 recent work suggests that the model has even
greater relevance in interorganizational settings. For example,
Clarke’s study of the regulatory response to a polychlorinated
biphenyl (PCB)-contaminated office building in Binghamton, New
York194 and Beamish’s analysis of the Guadalupe Dunes oil spill195
point to how, in an interagency context, bounded fields of attention,
indistinct problems, unclear procedures, fluid agency participation,
and conflicting priorities inform how contamination is addressed and
how solutions are paired with problems in specific choice situations.

188. See Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral
Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253 (1959).
189. Thomas D. Beamish, Waiting for Crisis: Regulatory Inaction and Ineptitude and the
Guadalupe Dunes Oil Spill, 49 SOC. PROBS. 150, 154 (2002).
190. Michael D. Cohen, Jarmes G. March & Johan P. Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of
Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1972).
191. THOMAS BEAMISH, SILENT SPILL: THE ORGANIZATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL CRISIS
91 (2002) (quoting W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN
SYSTEMS 274 (1981)).
192. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 54.
193. Jonathan Bendor, Terry M. Moe & Kenneth W. Shotts, Recycling the Garbage Can:
An Assessment of the Research Program, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 169 (2001).
194. See generally LEE CLARKE, ACCEPTABLE RISK? MAKING DECISIONS IN A TOXIC
ENVIRONMENT (1989).
195. BEAMISH, supra note 191.
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To improve contingency planning, we must better understand how
those linkages occur.
2. Drift
A second debate that is recast by multiagency response is the
extent to which an organization is prone to crisis. Turner’s grounded
theory of the origins of disasters zeroed in on the faulty premises,
misplaced optimism, and ignored danger signals that contribute to
an accident during an incubation period.196 Gephart, Shrivastava, and
others added political and external factors to explain their root
causes, while Perrow was the first to provide a framework to study
how certain factors interact.197 Perrow argues that organizations are
“error-inducing” systems to the extent they exhibit interactive
complexity (which allows independent failures to combine in
unforeseen ways) and tight as opposed to loose coupling (which
allows mistakes or failures to quickly escalate before they are
understood).198 The basic message of “normal accident” theory is
that accidents are inherent in the structure and technology of an
organization. Complexity and coupling render what are at first minor
technical problems either invisible or incompatible with existing
categories of inquiry by facility managers. Beginning with the Three
Mile Island nuclear accident, Perrow distinguishes systems accidents
from those caused by operator or equipment failure.199
Like Beamish and Clarke, Perrow relies on a garbage can model
of decision making for normal accident theory.200 The theory helps
us build on the basic problem of organizing, that of creating
organizations that function as a single entity (integration) while
maintaining enough internal diversity (differentiation) to allow them
196. Turner, supra note 10.
197. David Wicks, Institutionalized Mindsets of Invulnerability: Differentiated
Institutional Fields and the Antecedents of Organizational Crisis, 22 ORG. STUD. 659, 660
(2001).
198. PERROW, supra note 29, at 4–5; Scott D. Sagan, Learning from Normal Accidents,
17 ORG. & ENV’T. 15, 16–18 (2004).
199. Charles Perrow, The President’s Commission and the Normal Accident, in ACCIDENT
AT THREE MILE ISLAND: THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS 174–76 (David L. Sills, C. Wolf & V.
Shelanski eds., 1982).
200. Charles Perrow, The Limits of Safety: The Enhancement of a Theory of Accidents, 2 J.
CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 212, 216–17 (1994). The garbage can model considers the
interplay of relatively independent streams of problems, personnel, solutions, and choice
opportunities. It seeks to understand the influence of organizational structure and design over
how these streams are linked together. Cohen, March, & Olsen, supra note 190, at 3–4.
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to respond to the complexity of their environments.201 Normal
accident theory does so by focusing on the mechanisms used to
maintain sufficient diversity: (a) establishing hierarchy to consider
problems at different levels, (b) allowing those with power to use the
hierarchy to encourage actions they approve of, or (c) creating
distinct subcultures through use of social pressures.202 Through these
mechanisms, diversity is enhanced (usually through loose coupling)
or diminished (usually through tight coupling). Thus, Weick
suggests that the theory, which began as a technologically
deterministic account of two common properties of systems,
concerns social processes as well as technological structures.203
While Sagan approvingly tested the theory against the Strategic
Air Command’s operations during the Cold War,204 the theory is
sometimes criticized for its inadequate falsifiability, as is true of its
more optimistic counterpart, the theory of high-reliability
organizations.205 Initially formulated by LaPorte, high-reliability
theory looks to air traffic control, nuclear powered aircraft carrier
decks, and submarines and asks how they achieve strong safety
records in the face of interactive complexity and tight coupling. The
answer is largely one of group socialization, redundancy, and
continuous training and simulation.206
The BP oil spill poses a question to both theories on an interorganizational scale: To what extent can contingency planning be
designed so that it is reliable while avoiding system-level failures?
The NCP grafts a potentially tightly coupled and interactively
complex system of decision-making onto environmental hazards,
where an ill-placed procedure or flow rate estimate can migrate
through the system and lead to potentially catastrophic outcomes
(e.g., earlier rig collapse, failed containment efforts, underground
blowout). Snook’s reconstruction of a friendly fire incident in Iraq
201. Karl E. Weick, Normal Accident Theory as Frame, Link, and Provocation, 17 ORG. &
ENV’T. 27, 28 (2004).
202. Id. at 29.
203. Id. at 29–30.
204. SCOTT D. SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY: ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDENTS, AND
NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1993).
205. Eugene A. Rosa, Celebrating a Citation Classic—and More, 18 ORG. & ENV’T. 229
(2005).
206. Todd R. LaPorte & Paula M. Consolini, Working in Practice but Not in Theory:
Theoretical Challenges of “High-Reliability Organizations,” 1 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
19 (1991); Karlene H. Roberts, Some Characteristics of One Type of High Reliability
Organization, 1 ORG. SCI. 160 (1990).
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suggests that when we add this multilevel (as well as a temporal)
dimension to the analysis of accidents, normal accident and highreliability theory can be treated as complementary.207 Here is the
event that Snook, himself a prior victim of friendly fire, analyzed:
Two army helicopters (UH-60s), based in Turkey, had been
assigned to land at a village just inside the Iraqi border . . . . The
helicopters were visible only intermittently on the air force AWACS
radars because their signals would fade in and out as they landed or
flew behind mountains. Radios in the army helicopters were
incompatible with those in the air force fighters. Furthermore, the
helicopters did not use a different electronic identification code
when they flew in Iraq from the one they used in Turkey, even
though all other friendly aircraft did. This discrepancy had
continued for almost three years of the peace-keeping operation.
On the morning of the shootdown, two air force F-15 fighter
planes, accustomed to air-to-air combat at high altitudes, were
assigned to sweep the secure zone for enemy aircraft. They believed
that they were the first aircraft in the secure zone that morning,
and when they spotted the two helicopters on their own radar
screens, they tried unsuccessfully to identify whether they were
friend or foe.208

Confusing the Black Hawks for Mil Mi-24 Hind-Ds, the pilots, after
attempting visual identification and help from an AWACS crew,
obliterated the two helicopters with air-to-air missiles.209 Snook
explains that breakdowns at multiple levels within the no-fly zone led
to “practical drift,” the “slow, steady uncoupling of local practice
from written procedure.”210 Karl Weick, whose theoretical work on
loose coupling inspired important elements of Snook’s theory,
describes the process of practical drift as follows:
When a global system is first designed, it is treated as a tightly
coupled system with safeguards built in to prevent worst-case
scenarios. When these designs are implemented, they often prove
unworkable locally. Units adopt their own local variations, which
207. SNOOK, supra note 62. For the importance of these elements, see Samir Shrivastava,
Karan Sonpar & Federica Pazzaglia, Normal Accident Theory Versus High Reliability Theory: A
Resolution and Call for an Open Systems View of Accidents, 62 HUM. REL. 1357, 1368–73
(2009).
208. Karl E. Weick, Two Reviews on Organizational Accidents, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 147,
147–48 (2001). For the complete account, see SNOOK, supra note 62, at 26–64.
209. SNOOK, supra note 62, at 59–64; Weick, supra note 208, at 148.
210. SNOOK, supra note 62, at 220.
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get perpetuated when new briefers inform new crews how we do
things around here. With each new generation of briefing, the
entire system becomes more loosely coupled, and the logic of the
local task becomes more compelling . . . . What is crucial in this
ongoing loosening of coordination is that each unit that is
following its own unique path assumes that all other groups are
behaving in accord with the original set of established rules. If a
system that has drifted into locally acceptable procedures suddenly
becomes tightly coupled, the local adaptations no longer mesh, and
this produces an incomprehensible catastrophic moment.211

In this way, a high-reliability system, such as a no-fly zone with fifty
thousand incident-free hours, can invite a “normal accident.”
The lessons for contingency planning are manifold. The
conditions of practical drift within the emergency response system
set out by the NCP, which may include actions by senior leaders,
intergroup isolation, and intragroup norms, need to be ferreted out.
More importantly, Snook shows that additional layers of rules and
coordination will not prevent the systems dynamics at play and, if
anything, will only introduce new ways for drift to occur. Rather, we
need to identify the design features of a “multilevel, multi-task,
organizational system that will increase the likelihood of
accomplishing the ‘total task’” when it presents itself.212 Such
systems design work will need to be cognizant of the three general
conditions of practical drift: (1) complex organizations that do not
have the opportunity to learn from trial and error and have a
corresponding tendency to overdesign, (2) lengthy periods of loose
coupling “sufficient to generate substantial gaps between globally
synchronized rules and local subgroup practice,” and (3) moments
where isolated subgroups become tightly coupled, such as during a
response action.213
3. Fire fighting
So far, I’ve suggested two ways in which a response effort can
recreate conditions of risk that are similar to those preceding a crisis.
Interorganizational anarchy abounds, adding contingency to how
solutions, problems, and choice settings will be aligned. And
practical drift suggests that even highly scripted contingency
211. Weick, supra note 208, at 149–50.
212. SNOOK, supra note 62, at 235.
213. Id. at 229.
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operations will introduce new risks, such as when previously isolated
teams are reassembled (more tightly coupled) during a response
action. These approaches to crisis mirror the literature’s focus on
how organizations fail to address novel events, beginning with
Turner’s account of the incubation period. For example, normal
accident and high-reliability theory disagree principally over how
novel events will be managed—will they remain hidden by complex
technology, defy existing categories of routine action, and
accumulate unnoticed, or can their effects be muted or designed
around with sufficient training and preoccupation with error?
Missing from these debates is an understanding of how nonnovel events lead to or worsen a crisis.214 The response in the Gulf
set contingency planning in motion under conditions of both
novelty, where interruptions occur for which an organization lacks
the appropriate response in its repertoire, and quantity, where
interruptions threaten the system’s information processing capacity
and lead to cycles of increased stress and rigidity.215 To design a
response framework is to appreciate how the two forms of
interruption interact with the stocks, flows, and feedback loops of
the system and lead to declining performance. Contingency planning
often reacts to the novelty of prior crises. It tries to widen conceptual
categories of response and fields of attention through additional
standard operating procedures and, along with this enlarged
repertoire, increases organizational responsibilities.216 At the same
time, mundane events, nonthreatening in isolation, can produce
system-level effects in their own way.
Here are three examples of the accumulation of non-novel events
during the Gulf oil spill response. The first concerns the use of
dispersants, which were applied heavily at the spill source, on the
surface nearby, and in other locations.217 The novelty of their use
included the fact that while the NCP gives the On-Scene
Coordinator the authority to authorize use of dispersants, it did not
schedule their approval for long-term, subsea application.218 Requests
214. Jenny W. Rudolph & Nelson P. Repenning, Disaster Dynamics: Understanding the
Role of Quantity in Organizational Collapse, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (2002).
215. Id. at 24–25. For a discussion of threat-rigidity dynamics in organizations, see Barry
M. Staw, Lance E. Sandelands & Jane E. Dutton, Threat-Rigidity Effects in Organizational
Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 501 (1981).
216. Rudolph & Repenning, supra note 214, at 25.
217. Working Paper No. 4, supra note 141, at 6–13.
218. Id. at 4–7.
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from the responsible party and Unified Command for their use had
to be considered based on operational conditions (such as windows
of effectiveness for skimming operations), health and safety (such as
when volatile organic compound surface levels exceeded air
monitoring limits for a seven-day period), and other factors.219 A
May 26 directive (followed by a revised directive on June 22)
curtailed their use but allowed for exemptions to impose limits for
surface and aerial application.220 The On-Scene Coordinator received
seventy-four requests for exemption.221 This added a number of
mundane tasks for the unified response to tend to on a daily basis:
monitoring aircraft tank levels, recording tank levels on surface
vessels, sorting and cataloguing records, calculating the dispersantto-oil ratio to check whether it fell within a certain range, and other
efforts, all of which became routine.222 In this way, the development
of new operational policy in the midst of an emergency response
included both novel and numerous interruptions that posed different
system-level risks to the response.
A second example is an event that occurred toward the end of
May 2010, when the Administration tripled the federal manpower
and resources available to the response effort.223 This taxed what was
at the time a thin-spread force in unforeseen ways. National Incident
Command staff dramatically increased their purchasing of skimmers
and boom deployment, some in areas unlikely to be affected.224 The
spill occurred during a “transfer season” where Coast Guard workers
were being reassigned to new ports.225 Coast Guard reservists could
be recalled, but only for a maximum of two, sixty-day intervals in a

219. See id. at 6–10.
220. See id. at 10; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DISPERSANT MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT
DIRECTIVE – ADDENDUM 3 (2010), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=21676;
Letter from Rep. Edward J. Markey, Chairman, Subcomm. on Energy and Env’t, to Admiral
Thad W. Allen, Nat’l Incident Commander 4, 7, tbl. 1 (July 30, 2010), available at
http://markey.house.gov/docs/07-30-10ejmtocgdispersants.pdf.
221. Letter from Rep. Edward J. Markey to Admiral Thad W. Allen, supra note 220, at
2.
222. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BP-HZN-CEC020605, DISPERSANT AND
MONITORING ASSESSMENT DIRECTIVE FOR SUBSURFACE DISPERSANT APPLICATION (2010),
available
at
http://globalwarming.house.gov/tools/3q08materials/files/DispersantDirective.pdf.
223. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 150–51;
Working Paper No. 2, supra note 144, at 7.
224. Working Paper No. 2, supra note 144, at 7.
225. Id. at 6.
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two year period.226 Other agencies were approached by the National
Incident Command to see whether they could send additional
responders. The Coast Guard eventually tripled personnel, keeping
track of their progress through a daily report, “Status on
Tripling.”227 Responders concluded that these efforts limited the
Coast Guard’s ability to conduct other missions within the recovery
operation.228
Specific efforts to approve berm-related projects provide a third
example of a system taxed by non-novel as well as novel events. The
Army Corps of Engineers offers a general permit—the NOD-2—
covering operations that respond to oil and gas well blowouts.229
This permit truncates environmental review but with a number of
important caveats. For example, the project must involve the
minimum work necessary to respond to the emergency, and it must
be temporary.230 In mid-May, the Louisiana State Coastal Protection
and Restoration Authority applied for an NOD-20 permit to build
offshore sand barrier berms.231 This was another solution not
contemplated in the contingency plans prior to the spill, novel for its
scale and for its many unintended effects, about which there was
little information to gauge the project’s environmental impacts. But
it was also subject to an environmental review process, involving
federal and state agencies under more than half a dozen statutes. The
Corps coordinated review of a revised application through hastily
organized emails, telephone calls, and written communications
between agencies prior to a “berm summit” in early June.232 The
Commission found that such a process strained the capacity of
emergency response agencies to properly comment on and approve
what was ultimately a cost-ineffective project that collected only
1,000 barrels of oil.233

226. Id. at 7.
227. Id.; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 151.
228. Working Paper No. 2, supra note 144, at 7.
229. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, The
Story of the Louisiana Berms Project 3 (Staff Working Paper No. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Berms%20
Working%20Paper.pdf.
230. Id. at 4.
231. Id. at 3.
232. See generally id. at 23–30.
233. See id. at 42; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at
271.
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These mixtures of novel and non-novel interruptions suggest the
need to better understand how, together, they tax an emergency
response system. While a novel event might call for enlarging a
system’s repertoire of responses, recombining procedures, and
increasing its resilience to cope with surprises, the number of such
interruptions can over time degrade or punish a system’s ability to
enact such solutions. Preparing for how a system will respond to
interruptions will require models of how such interruptions arrive,
accumulate, and dissipate, how they impair the execution of
necessary cognitive processes, and the role of feedback loops in
triggering the system’s declining performance.
We should pay particular attention to how a system can descend
into “fire fighting,” a condition of crisis management involving the
interaction of system stocks and flows.234 For example, Repenning
considers how a product development process might be crippled by
fire fighting.235 Specifically, the number of tasks required to complete
a project might increase slightly. This will marginally decrease the
portion of concept development tasks that are finished in a given
period. There will in turn be more design-phase problems and
diminished final product quality. If this “shock” to the design system
is limited, and the workload returns to normal, it might be
contained. Or it could spread, with the system engaged in little
concept development with final product quality substantially
degraded.236
Managers will respond to the initial descent into fire fighting by
shifting resources. For example, a product manager might devote
greater resources to a product with late-development problems. This
allocation will lead to a local optimum, where the project is
improved while the broader product development system is
degraded. Managers are prone to give too much weight to the shortterm benefits of their decisions, while the systems effects of those
decisions are delayed. Moreover, managers make attribution errors,
such as when they blame the attitudes of people within the process as
opposed to its broader structure. Therefore, they will make further
decisions that will increase the vicious cycle by adding surveillance,
reporting requirements, and other procedures to the work of
234. See Nelson P. Repenning, Understanding Fire Fighting in New Product
Development, 18 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 285 (2001).
235. See id. at 287–95.
236. Id. at 291.
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product engineers.237 To address problems of quantity in the
response to environmental crises will require more dynamic resource
planning techniques and a better understanding of how to combine
double-loop learning (called for in the response to a novel event)
with greater adherence to existing routines (that can prevent a
system from descending into a cycle of declining performance).238
B. Organizational Cognition
1. Schemas
The twin tasks of differentiation and integration that dominate
organizing provide the setting in which the above system effects
occur. The scope of these effects, such as interorganizational
anarchy, practical drift, and fire fighting, is increased when they
happen among, as opposed to within, organizations, such as in the
midst of a response to an oil spill. They should give us pause before
casually accepting calls for expanding plans and procedures featuring
dozens of agencies and support teams. In addition to risks
introduced by the structure of a response, we also have to consider
how groups and individuals make sense of information and actions
taken within the response system. Contingency planning hints at the
cognitive management challenges inherent in organizing that should
lead us to reconsider the mechanics of dramatically increased datagathering efforts following disasters. While system effects speak to
the unintended consequences of organizational solutions to previous
disasters, cognition concerns how organizations process information
and make sense of those solutions.
The unified response team was inundated with data that it had to
process and understand. This raises three related concerns, each
involving the paradox of organizing, discussed in the following three
sections. The first is an information-processing problem. Organizing
encourages the use of schemas, which are fixed categories and
simplifying representations that impose order on the steady stream of
information entering a system.239 For example, prior to 9/11, the
intelligence community was concerned with a number of terrorist
scenarios, including hijackings of single as opposed to multiple
237. Id. at 296–97.
238. See Rudolph & Repenning, supra note 214, at 25–27.
239. See Elsbach, Barr & Hargadon, supra note 71, at 422; see also Paul DiMaggio,
Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 263 (1997).
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aircraft, hijackings to gain the release of individuals held by the U.S.
government, or the destruction of aircraft that were set with
explosives overseas.240 There was little or no effort to develop
terrorist scenarios involving hijackings of multiple aircraft that were
domestic in origin, with no motive to communicate, and where the
planes themselves would be used as explosives.241
After the Gulf oil spill, Admiral Thad Allen similarly recalled that
procedures in place that seemed effective for twenty years “became
dysfunctional” given the magnitude of the spill.242 Post-disaster
investigations reveal that important categories of action, such as
addressing methane hydrate formation after, rather than before,
equipment installation, establishing federal oversight over rig fires
without the presence of a fire marshal, keeping oil out of marshlands
instead of instituting Coast Guard procedures for its removal, using
subsea in addition to surface dispersants, and responding to
continuous leaks as opposed to discrete spills either inadequately
informed contingency planning or were ignored.243
A reasonable reaction to such findings would be to develop new
categories to determine what are considered “in-family” as opposed
to “out-of-family” events.244 In-family events are those that were at
some point experienced and analyzed. Unique standard operating
procedures might be built up around in-family events for future use,
but the broader problem is schema-based processing itself, which
teases in-family problems from the stream of data that organizations
face. Schema-based processing, with its fixed categories and routines
that store prior learning, is not ideal for responding to lowprobability, high-consequence events.245 Specifically, during a crisis
240. See Kelman, supra note 22, at 133.
241. See Weick, supra note 73, at 425.
242. Video: Meeting 3: September 27–28, 2010, Washington D.C. (Nat’l Commision on
BP
Deepwater
Horizon
Oil
Spill
&
Offshore
Drilling,
2010),
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/meeting-video/320 (testimony of Admiral Thad W.
Allen).
243. See DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 145–46;
U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 171, at 78–79, 87; Working Paper No. 2, supra note 144, at
18; Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 10–11; Video: Meeting 3: September 27–28,
2010, Washington D.C., (Nat’l Commision on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore
Drilling, 2010), http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/meeting-video/320 (testimony of
William Nungesser, Plaquemines Parish President). See generally Working Paper No. 4, supra
note 141.
244. See Weick, supra note 73, at 426.
245. See Kelman, supra note 22, at 133; Charles F. Parker & Eric K. Stern, Bolt from the
Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise, 1
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operation, there is a need for cognition that is not limited by
automatic thinking (encouraged by standardization) or memory and
sequential linkages of existing categories (encouraged by rule-based
planning).246 Automatic and rule-based cognition limit an
organization’s ability to address novelty.247 They erase necessary
detail and inhibit efforts to unify bits of seemingly disparate
information. Disasters require “controlled” cognition that will limit
the chance that novel events or threats during a response will be
perceived as “in-family” and handled with existing schemas or
linkages of procedures.248
While post-disaster accounts focus on the need for stronger
coordination, added hierarchies within or across organizations can
discourage controlled cognition. This is because hierarchies increase
the demand for sequential or rule-based interaction among an
organization’s subunits.249 The goal should be to locate where in a
response system activity can be coordinated by mutual constraint and
adjustment, as opposed to by plan or standardization across groups
that hold mutually exclusive knowledge of a situation. To respond to
a crisis using controlled cognition, the system should add
redundancies of representation to the redundant technologies that
are more often put into place.250 It should encourage overlapping
knowledge across groups that are governed by loose coupling. Weak
coordination will increase the extent to which groups return to
earlier activities, preserving detail and encouraging a more nuanced
understanding of novel contexts.251 Subunits should be made better
aware of how their outputs can become inputs for other groups.
Strengthening awareness of how each group must adjust its actions
to fit the actions of others should be given priority.252 This will
increase the number of elements of a response system that can detect
FOREIGN POL’Y ANALYSIS 301, 304, 310 (2005); Weick, supra note 73, at 425–26.
246. THOMPSON, supra note 58, at 54–56; see Weick, supra note 73, at 427–31.
247. See Weick, supra note 73, at 431–33.
248. See id. at 426.
249. See id. at 431.
250. See, e.g., Elsbach, Barr & Hargadon, supra note 71, at 429–30; A. Alexandra
Michel, A Distributed Cognition Perspective on Newcomers’ Change Processes: The Management
of Cognitive Uncertainty in Two Investment Banks, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 507, 511–13 (2007);
Karl E. Weick & Karlene H. Roberts, Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating
on Flight Decks, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 357, 358–61 (1993).
251. See KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED:
RESILIENT PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 32–35, 53–58 (2d ed. 2007).
252. See Weick, supra note 73, at 430–31.
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discrepancies from prior events, preserving vital information about
novel threats as they emerge. Ultimately, each of these steps will
reduce schema-based decision-making.
2. Self-limiting data
A second reaction to the stream of data and experience that
characterizes crisis management is to call for greater amounts or
different kinds of information. While organizing influences how that
information is processed, it also affects how it is shared.
Differentiation begins with the premise that cognitive load should be
reduced by distributing information across groups. But structural
differentiation also leads to information becoming lost or misplaced.
During the oil spill, streams of data were directed up and down a
rudimentary chain of command, and later, a more formal hierarchy.
Data were distributed among agency heads and members of the
National Response Team, between and within national laboratory,
science advisory, and technical teams, and with the responsible party
and the public, among other channels.253 For example, a team of
scientists from three national laboratories provided diagnostic
information to a Science Advisory Team created by Secretary Chu.
The advisory team responded with its own data analysis tasks for the
tri-labs team. BP was eventually asked to create worst-case scenarios
for the outcomes of future decisions. The advisory team reviewed
source control plans, and industry representatives provided
additional information.254 Much of this work proceeded via
conference call.255 These data sharing efforts were grafted onto and
in addition to existing Unified Command structures.256 The number
of constraints inhibiting adequate data sharing on dispersant
availability and toxicity, skimmer location and manufacturing,
closure of certain waters, sampling and water and air quality
monitoring, well containment and collection innovations, shoreline
conditions, and other issues was substantial.
The composition of response teams and ad hoc groups, such as
the tri-labs team and Flow Rate Technical Group, can reduce the
quality of information exchanged. Diverse groups are organized to
253. See DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 131,
134–43, 148–49.
254. See id. at 148–49; Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 24.
255. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 161.
256. Id. at 149.
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mimic the complexity of an organization’s environment (an approach
known as “requisite variety”).257 But if information is ambiguous,
multiple viewpoints will increase the number of equally plausible
meanings available.258 This will increase the likelihood that weak but
important signals in the data will lie dormant. If they are in fact
addressed, equally plausible meanings tend to be resolved through
group decision-making processes that limit analysis and heighten
advocacy.259 Diverse groups of specialists also fall victim to common
knowledge and audience tuning effects.260 In particular, discussion of
unique information is limited, as specialists working in teams focus
on perceptions held in common. These dynamics also make it
difficult to detect important anomalies.
In addition, as the number of parties addressing a problem
increases, the likelihood that each will obtain precisely the same
information decreases.261 Specifically, increasing the number of
parties increases the number of interpretations of information,
making it more difficult to reach consensus. Groups also spend an
inordinate amount of time decomposing information based on
functional divisions (a “partition focus”).262 Those divisions may be
no longer relevant, or might further lead to loss of information. The
spill response was criticized for missing data gathering opportunities
because of its focus on coordination tasks.263 These group dynamics
suggest the need for closer attention to the self-limiting qualities of
information, as well as how available information is negotiated.
Particularly where a decision-making process is not yet worked out,
as in the early weeks of the oil spill, novel information must pass tests
of social as well as technical sufficiency across functional specialists,
such as the theoretical scientists and engineers on the advisory team

257. KARL E. WEICK, MAKING SENSE OF THE ORGANIZATION 332–35 (2001).
258. Garold Strasser, The Uncertain Role of Unshared Information in Collective Choice, in
SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 49–69 (Leigh
L. Thompson, John M. Levine & David M. Messick eds., 1999); see also Kathleen M. Sutcliff,
Information Handling Challenges in Complex Systems, 8 INT’L PUB. MGMT. J. 417 (2005).
259. Strasser, supra note 258, at 49–69.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Chip Heath & Nancy Staudenmayer, Coordination Neglect: How Lay Theories of
Organizing Complicate Coordination in Organizations, in 22 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR 153, 158 (Barry M. Staw & Robert Sutton eds., 2000).
263. See, e.g., DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 78;
Working Paper No. 2, supra note 133, at 8.
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and at BP.264 This process arguably slowed containment efforts. Such
“negotiated information orders” arose around attempts to prove the
validity of oil collection methods to the tri-labs team, develop
monitoring protocols for well control operations, and agree to such
tactically vital pieces of information as flow rate from the riser leak.265
3. Enactment
The workings of ad hoc groups during the spill response suggest
a third concern for organizational cognition: any response to a crisis
will occur largely through enactment rather than planning.266
Enactment happens when a stream of data and events becomes
unintelligible, such as when a context is unfamiliar, a situation exists
for which an organization has no operating procedures,267 or an
event has too many equivocal meanings.268 In those moments, order
must be imposed on the world. The spill response was punctuated
with moments for which there was no map suggesting how to
proceed: flow rates were revised, dispersants were used in novel ways
revealing new operational concerns, and well-closure tests failed or
yielded ambiguous results. In those kinds of moments, organizations
engage in sensemaking, an ongoing, retrospective development of
plausible rationales for actions already taken.269 Through
sensemaking, organizations impose order on the world in the form
of workable but temporary perceptual frameworks.
An imposed or “enacted” order occurs through action and
interpretation, not evaluation and choice. Crisis situations are
constructed as much as they are already in existence. Actors such as
the On-Scene Coordinator or members of a technical group
construct a crisis as they search for reasons that will allow them to
resume interrupted activities. Dispersant uses are retroactively
authorized when new justifications emerge, such as their reduction
of surface-level volatile organic compounds.270 Other uses must be

264. See Carol A. Heimer, Allocating Information Costs in a Negotiated Information
Order, 30 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 395, 397 (1985).
265. See id. at 395.
266. See Weick, supra note 1; Karl E. Weick, Kathleen M. Sutcliffe & David Obstfeld,
Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking, 16 ORG. SCI. 409 (2005).
267. Weick, supra note 73, at 305.
268. Id. at 410.
269. Id. at 409.
270. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 144–45.
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approved under conditions for which there are little or no data: a
failed top-kill procedure leads to a thought of collecting
hydrocarbons instead,271 increased flow rate estimates present a new
reality,272 and the Well Integrity Team, including scientists from the
national labs and the U.S. Geological Survey, arrives at a monitoring
protocol to detect leaks into rock formations after a capping
operation.273
The presidential commission describes how order was imposed
on the situation through testing and modeling efforts after a capping
stack was fitted to the wellbore. Pressure test data revealed either an
underground blowout, a different flow rate, or a new geological
reality.
Although the Well Integrity Team had calculated that it would take
a total leak of approximately 100,000 barrels for hydrocarbons to
reach the sea floor, the government determined that it would
permit a leak of only 20,000 barrels before requiring the capping
stack to be reopened. Using this figure and an estimate for the
expected pressure at shut-in derived from BP’s modeling of the
reservoir, the Well Integrity Team created guidelines for the test. If
the pressure at shut-in was less than 6,000 psi, major well damage
was likely: BP would have to terminate the test within six hours and
reopen the well. If the shut-in pressure was greater than 7,500 psi,
the risk of a leak was low, and the test could proceed for the full 48
hours. Finally, if the shut-in pressure was between 6,000 and 7,500
psi, the risk of a leak was uncertain—either there was a mediumsized leak into the formation or the reservoir was highly depleted.
Under this scenario, the test could proceed for 24 hours. . . .
. . . Initial wellhead pressure readings were just over 6,600 psi,
squarely in the uncertain middle range, and rising slowly. . . .
....
. . . The stakes were high. Keeping the stack shut could cause an
underground blowout and, in the worst case, loss of a significant
portion of the 110 million barrel reservoir into the Gulf. . . .
. . . One participant recalled general agreement that, while the data
supported reopening the capping stack, under the guidelines

271. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 20–22.
272. Id. at 16.
273. Id. at 28.
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established prior to shut-in, the stack could stay closed during the
night.
....
Overnight, [Well Integrity Team member] Hsieh attempted to
develop a model that explained the results of the well integrity test.
The biggest question was why the pressure had climbed above
6,600 psi but not to the minimum expected shut-in pressure of
7,500 psi. The answer was that the expectation had been based on
an incomplete understanding of the reservoir’s geometry and on
pressure readings from a gauge at the bottom of the BOP, which
was inaccurate and functioning only sporadically. Using accurate
pressure readings from the capping stack, along with a flow-rate
estimate of 55,000 bbls/day and BP’s estimate that the reservoir
originally contained 110 million barrels of oil, Hsieh was able to
generate a model of the depleted reservoir that predicted the
observed shut-in pressures without having to assume a significant
leak into the formation.
....
. . . As more time passed, Hsieh was able to improve his model
using seismic data. The model continued to predict the behavior of
the well, and a leak into the formation became a less and less likely
scenario.274

Enactment demonstrates that cognition can be created through
action. Specifically, cognition lies in the patterns of interaction that
occur in specific contexts.275 Those connections among behaviors, as
opposed to individuals, are a critical unit of analysis for crisis
response. We need to better understand the combinations of
schemas and social contexts (i.e., patterns of interaction) that
encourage the rich awareness of detail, reluctance to simplify, and
sensitivity to operations that will avoid catastrophic outcomes as
workable frameworks are created and imposed on new, ambiguous
information. And we need to study patterns of work to locate
reasons that are used to argue for a resumption of interrupted
activities (such as industry conventions, prior expectations, and
premises about how organizations work) and determine their role in
facilitating or disrupting disaster response.276
274. Id. at 30–33.
275. Elsbach, Barr & Hargadon, supra note 71, at 422.
276. See Stephen R. Barley & Gideon Kunda, Bringing Work Back In, 12 ORG. SCI. 76,
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V. CONCLUSION
The paradox of organizing offers a useful frame for articulating
the challenges of responding to an environmental crisis. The struggle
to differentiate tasks and subunits and then piece them together
during moments of great uncertainty, and the ways in which it can
challenge and strain contingency planning, should receive greater
attention. This Article takes a preliminary step by addressing how the
organizational causes of crisis, rooted in the paradox of organizing
and related information management challenges, are recreated and
intensified during an interorganizational response. The dynamics at
work included risk amplification and system degradation due to the
structure of the response, including anarchy, drift, and fire fighting.
They also involved the tasks of making sense of information within
the response effort, which erases detail, limits whether data can be
used to detect anomalies, and encourages responders to develop
their own plausible rationales for equivocal data so that they can
resume their tasks. Learning how the emergency response system,
including the National Contingency Plan, might overcome these
challenges deserves a place alongside the reporting requirements,
safety compliance systems, data collection measures, redundant
technologies, and other solutions that populate our assessments of
environmental crises.
Future commissions, those who develop emergency management
systems, and legal scholars should consider how this paradox could
be better managed. Research on incident command systems suggests
that under certain circumstances, it is possible to blend traditional
elements of bureaucracy (e.g., specialized roles, formal authority)
with temporary organizations in a manner that achieves high
reliability.277 Much is required, however, for such a system to prove
effective. First, the system must be able to rapidly alter its formal
structure. The process of altering a command system includes
structure elaborating (filling various roles and positions while making
sure that major activities are not assigned to specialized roles), role
switching (transferring personnel according to role as a crisis
evolves), authority migrating (distributing critical expertise

84–85 (2001).
277. Gregory A. Bigley & Karlene H. Roberts, The Incident Command System: HighReliability Organizing for Complex and Volatile Task Environments, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1281
(2001).
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throughout the system, allowing decision-making authority to
migrate quickly among existing positions and giving deference to
lower level, more technically qualified members of the team), and
system resetting (enabling a complete reconfiguration of the system
in response to unexpected events).278 Second, the system must allow
for an appropriate amount of constrained improvisation, bounded by
existing rules and routines.279 Finally, managers must encourage
overlapping, accurate understandings of the systems of activity to
which response team members belong (also called “operational
representation”).280 Maintaining the integrity of operational
representation throughout a command system as it is developed,
communicated, and shifted is crucial to the system’s ability to
respond to novelty while muting the effects of practical drift. The
extent to which an incident command system can use structuring and
cognitive management approaches to counteract the dynamics
addressed in this Article should be the focus of future investigations
and reform efforts.
The challenges posed by the paradox of organizing can also
inform the growing concern over agency fragmentation, in
environmental law and elsewhere in the administrative state.281 The
paradox of organizing is helpful in several ways. It suggests how we
might define the concept of coordination, which Jody Freeman and
Jim Rossi identify as the root cause of governance failures stemming
from inter-agency delegation and overlap: “Such delegations may
produce redundancy, inefficiency, and gaps, but more than anything
else, they create profound coordination challenges.”282 Freeman and
Rossi make an important contribution, setting out the origins and
types of multiagency delegations, explaining why consolidation will
278. Id. at 1286–88.
279. Id. at 1288–90.
280. Id. at 1290–92; see also Smith & Tushman, supra note 61, at 525–29.
281. See, e.g., William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of
Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
457 (2010); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); Jody Freeman & Dan Farber, Modular Environmental
Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red
Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757
(2003).
282. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Collaboration in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination
Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578 (2010) (elevating coordination to the
level of preventing defection in our understanding of modern regulatory intervention).
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only be available under limited circumstances, and comparing the
costs and benefits of coordination tools such as consultation, interagency agreement, joint policy-making, and centralized review.283
But coordination is inherently difficult to define. In the disaster
management literature, confusion over the concept leads to
disagreement over how a successful response operation should be
defined.284 As was pointed out in the late 1970s, such confusion
exists because there are in fact too many definitions of
interorganizational coordination.285 Each embraces a different school
of theory, be it game theory, resource exchange, contingency theory,
or transaction cost economics, among others.286 Clarification of the
concept of coordination is also needed to specify its costs and
benefits, whether it happens in the midst of a crisis or during more
routine actions, and to guide discussion of how coordination can be
improved after an exogenous shock to an interorganizational system.
Viewing environmental crisis response as a coordination problem
suggests that the simplest definition may be the most helpful.
Thompson’s research on organizing provided the foundation for
some of the key dynamics that were set in motion during the BP oil
spill response, such as Weick’s work on the influence of hierarchy on
cognition or Snook’s concept of practical drift. At its core is the
notion of coordination as the management of dependencies among
actions.287 Thompson recognized that the process of differentiation,
which sets the paradox of organizing in motion, leads to different
levels of interdependence among organizations or subunits.288 Each
form of interdependence (his focus was limited to three kinds:
283. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 282.
284. Thomas E. Drabek & David A. McEntire, Emergent Phenomena and
Multiorganizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature, 20 INT’L
J. MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS 197, 204–05 (2002) (suggesting such definitions as (a)
taking account of the activities of others, (b) deliberate adjustment, (c) relaying information so
that individual efforts are linked with those of others, (d) agreeing on function priority and
performance efforts, (e) integrating tasks reinforced by norms, and (f) eliminating gaps in
service and unnecessary duplications of service).
285. AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF
POLICY ANALYSIS (1979).
286. See, e.g., ERNEST R. ALEXANDER, HOW ORGANIZATIONS ACT TOGETHER:
INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7–14 (1995); Thomas
W. Malone & Kevin Crowston, The Interdisciplinary Study of Coordination, in
COORDINATION THEORY AND COLLABORATION TECHNOLOGY 40–43 (Gary M. Olson,
Thomas W. Malone & John B. Smith eds., 2001); Ahdieh, supra note 282, at 603–07.
287. Malone & Crowston, supra note 286, at 10.
288. THOMPSON, supra note 58, at 54–56.
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pooled, sequential, and reciprocal) calls for different coordination
mechanisms, the use or ill use of which can lead to failures to detect
anomaly, mistakes that gain momentum as they migrate across
organizations, inappropriate mixtures of adjustment to novelty and
adherence to existing routines, and other problems that were
discussed in this Article.
Thompson’s innovation was to recognize that the form of
interdependence significantly affects the form of coordination
applied within or across organizations. The concept of
interdependence has been used to define the costs of coordination
since at least the work of early systems theorists and organization
design scholars often use the terms interchangeably.289 Further
research on the challenges of regulatory overlap and fragmentation
should expand upon this work. It should set out the common
dependencies, both actual and interpretive, that arise in different
regulatory contexts,290 using Thompson’s typology of pooled,
sequential, and reciprocal interdependence and related coordination
mechanisms as a point of departure. Research on environmental and
other crises should determine the processes available to manage these
and other forms of interdependence291 and whether their use during
a crisis will lead to risk accumulation, system degradation, or
resilience. The next commission should take note of what this
research has yet to discover.

289. Ranjay Gulati & Harbir Singh, The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing
Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 781,
784–85 (1998).
290. See Malone & Crowston, supra note 286, at 12, for some common examples of
dependencies, including shared resources, simultaneity constraints, and task-subtask
considerations.
291. See ALEXANDER, supra note 286, at 31–36, for further examples within each
element of Thompson’s typology.
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